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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The IAEA, NRC, and DOE regulations and requirements for safeguarding 
nuclear material and facilities have been reviewed and each organization’s 
purpose, objectives, and scope are discussed in this report. Current safeguards 
approaches are re-examined considering technological advancements and how 
these developments are changing safeguards approaches used by these 
organizations. 
Additionally, the physical protection approaches required by the IAEA, 
NRC, and DOE were reviewed and the respective goals, objectives, and 
requirements are identified and summarized in this report. From these, a brief 
comparison is presented showing the high-level similarities among these 
regulatory organizations’ approaches to physical protection. 
The regulatory documents used in this paper have been assembled into a 
convenient reference library called the Nuclear Safeguards and Security 
Reference Library. The index of that library is included in this report, and DVDs 
containing the full library are available. 
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The Concept of Goals-Driven Safeguards 
This report explores the concept of achieving safeguards goals by taking advantage of the 
inherent characteristics of advanced processing and reactor systems rather than by attempting to 
apply the detailed requirements that have been developed for conventional processing systems 
and existing reactors. A brief review of current safeguards goals, as expressed by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and United States 
Department of Energy (U.S. DOE) is included. An example is then presented of an advanced 
processing system in which safeguards are achieved in an augmented manner. This is different 
than what is done in today’s processing plants, potentially achieving a higher level of safeguards 
effectiveness. 
Also, the most pertinent physical security regulations and requirements for securing nuclear 
materials and facilities, established by the IAEA, NRC, and U.S. DOE, are outlined and discussed 
in Appendix A. In Appendix B, the most relevant safeguards and security documents used in this 
report have been assembled into a quick- and targeted-reference library called the Nuclear 
Safeguards and Security Reference Library. 
1. SAFEGUARDS – BACKGROUND AND BASIS 
Safeguards have been developed and implemented by a number of domestic and international 
organizations to ensure that any potential weapons-usable fissionable civilian nuclear materials 
are not used for military purposes. To accomplish this goal, more specific requirements for the 
safeguards systems have been developed by various organizations, including the IAEA, the NRC, 
and the U.S. DOE. These requirements reflected the concerns that arose regarding the 
technologies for reactors, processing, and other systems that were in use, or perhaps planned for 
use, at the time the safeguards approaches were created. As such, the safeguards approaches have 
technology-specific features based on applications to such systems. The safeguards approaches 
also reflected the state of the technologies that could be used to monitor, track, and protect 
potential weapons-usable materials. As these technologies evolved, including those for 
monitoring and protection, safeguards approaches have also evolved. 
The development of processing technologies in the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) 
project are radically different from technologies applied in existing commercial facilities, and 
proposals to link these technologies with reactor types are not in widespread use. For this reason, 
it is prudent to re-examine the bases for existing safeguards approaches and evaluate the 
appropriateness of extending these systems to the new technologies. It is also reasonable to 
examine the creation of new safeguards approaches specifically designed to take advantage of the 
characteristics of each processing technology and reactor system. To facilitate such an evaluation, 
it is necessary to review the existing safeguards goals, both domestic and international. In this 
report, the IAEA international safeguards are reviewed first, and then domestic safeguards are 
discussed based on NRC and DOE requirements. 
1.1 International Safeguards: The IAEA 
Internationally, the IAEA has been charged with the task of developing and implementing a 
safeguards system, according to the following statements from the IAEA Safeguards Glossary,1 
Chapter 1. The IAEA first wrote it “with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized 
safeguards terminology within the international community.” Since then, the glossary has been 
revised several times to reflect the evolution of the safeguards agreements and measures, 
including the development of integrated safeguards starting in 1999. 
IAEA Safeguards Glossary, Chapter 1.  LEGAL INSTRUMENTS AND 
OTHER DOCUMENTS RELATED TO IAEA SAFEGUARDS 
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 Safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
are an important element of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. 
This section provides information on legal instruments and other 
documents in the area of nuclear non-proliferation that establish the 
bases of the IAEA safeguards system or are otherwise closely linked to 
the application of IAEA safeguards. These include the Statute of the 
IAEA, treaties and supply agreements calling for the verification of 
nonproliferation undertakings, the basic safeguards documents, 
safeguards agreements and their relevant protocols, and guidelines 
related to the implementation of IAEA safeguards. 
1.1 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency — the Statute of 
the IAEA [ST] was approved in October 1956 by the United Nations 
Conference on the Statute of the IAEA and entered into force in July 
1957, as amended. According to Article II, the IAEA shall “seek to 
accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, 
health and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is 
able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its 
supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military 
purpose.” By Article III.A.5, the IAEA is authorized to “establish and 
administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and 
other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made 
available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or 
control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; 
and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or 
multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that 
State’s activities in the field of atomic energy.” Under this Article, the 
IAEA concludes agreements with the State or States concerned which 
refer to the application of safeguards. Articles XII.A and XII.B deal with 
the rights and responsibilities of the IAEA with respect to the application 
of safeguards and provide, inter alia, for IAEA inspection in the State or 
States concerned. Article XII.C refers to actions which may be taken by 
the IAEA in possible cases of non-compliance with safeguards 
agreements. 
The underlined phrase defines the goals of IAEA safeguards. Since the special fissionable 
and other materials include all uranium (from depleted through enriched), thorium, and the 
plutonium isotope Pu-239, the processing and recycling in the advanced nuclear fuel cycles 
studied in the AFCI program will always use these materials. Any fuel processing and recycling 
approach must account for the need to ensure that the technologies would enable satisfying the 
requirement of non-military use of these materials. 
This charter by the United Nations is supplemented by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
which explains the need for safeguards and the activities and materials to which they apply, as 
described in the following section:1 
IAEA Safeguards Glossary, Chapter 1.2. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT) — the cornerstone 
of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Treaty was opened for 
signature in 1968, and entered into force in 1970; as of 31 December 
2001, it is in force in 187 States. In 1995, the Treaty was extended 
indefinitely. Pursuant to Article I, each nuclear weapon State party to the 
NPT undertakes not to transfer, to any recipient whatsoever, nuclear 
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weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such 
weapons or devices directly or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, 
encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or 
otherwise acquire such weapons or devices or control over such 
weapons or devices. 
Pursuant to Article II, each non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT 
undertakes not to receive the transfer, from any transferor whatsoever, of 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such 
weapons or devices directly or indirectly; not to manufacture or 
otherwise acquire such weapons or devices; and not to seek or receive 
any assistance in the manufacture of such weapons or devices. Pursuant 
to Article III.1, each non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT 
undertakes to accept IAEA safeguards on all source or special 
fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory 
of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control 
anywhere. Pursuant to Article III.2, each State party to the NPT 
undertakes not to provide source or special fissionable material, or 
equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the 
processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-
nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special 
fissionable material is subject to the safeguards required by Article III.1. 
Article III.4 requires each non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT to 
conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, either individually or 
together with other States, within 18 months of the date on which the 
State deposits its instruments of ratification of or accession to the Treaty. 
Article IV affirms the right of all parties to the NPT to develop research, 
production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to 
facilitate and participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, 
materials and information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
The underlined sections identify the requirements on special nuclear material and 
technologies that can be used to produce special nuclear material. Again, the purpose is to ensure 
that such materials are not used for military purposes. There is additional detail in Chapter 1 of 
Reference 1 on implementing treaties and supply agreements, their basic safeguards documents 
including the Inspectorate, the Safeguards System, and other aspects such as the voluntary offer 
agreement, the additional protocol, and some guidelines and recommendations. 
It is also important to note that safeguards implementation is governed by safeguards 
agreements. The activities that the secretariat considers necessary for fulfilling the agency’s 
responsibilities under these agreements are incorporated in the safeguards criteria. These criteria 
are used for planning safeguards implementation activities in the field and at headquarters for all 
facilities and locations outside facilities as well as for the evaluation of inspection goal attainment 
at facilities and safeguards evaluation at the level of Entire States. 
1.1.1 IAEA Safeguards Purpose, Objectives and Scope 
In order to set up the IAEA safeguards, the IAEA further defines its intentions and adds 
specific details on the safeguards objectives in Chapter 2 of the Safeguards Glossary,1 as follows. 
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IAEA Safeguards Glossary, Chapter 2. IAEA SAFEGUARDS: 
PURPOSE, OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE 
Safeguards are applied by the IAEA to verify that commitments made by 
States under safeguards agreements with the IAEA are fulfilled. It is 
therefore necessary to define the objectives of safeguards in technical 
terms relevant to each type of safeguards agreement so that safeguards 
can be applied in an effective manner. What follows is an explanation of 
terms used in connection with safeguards objectives and with the scope 
of application of safeguards relevant to the safeguards agreement and 
additional protocols. 
2.1. Objectives of IAEA safeguards — under a comprehensive safeguards 
agreement (CSA), safeguards are applied to verify a State’s compliance 
with its undertaking to accept safeguards on all nuclear material in all 
its peaceful nuclear activities and to verify that such material is not 
diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In this 
regard, the technical objective is specified: “the timely detection of 
diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful 
nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other 
nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of 
such diversion by the risk of early detection” [153, para. 28]. To address 
fully the verification of a State’s compliance with its undertaking under a 
CSA, a second technical objective is pursued, viz. the detection of 
undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State (see No. 2.5). The 
implementation of measures under additional protocols based on [540] 
significantly strengthens the IAEA’s capability to achieve this objective 
(see No. 3.6). 
For an INFCIRC/66-type safeguards agreement, the objective is to 
ensure that the nuclear material, non-nuclear material, services, 
equipment, facilities and information specified and placed under 
safeguards are not used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or any 
other nuclear explosive devices or to further any military purpose. To 
achieve this, the IAEA applies essentially the same technical objective in 
regard to detection of diversion of the nuclear material specified and 
placed under safeguards, as well as the detection of any misuse of the 
non-nuclear material, services, equipment, facilities or information 
specified and placed under safeguards. This is also the case for the 
nuclear material and/or facilities to which safeguards are applied under 
a voluntary offer safeguards agreement concluded between a nuclear 
weapon State and the IAEA. 
As stated in the underlined phrases, the objectives of IAEA safeguards are the timely 
detection and diversion of significant quantities of nuclear materials and the detection of any 
undeclared nuclear materials or activities. The first objective is a function of the facilities and 
technologies being used at declared facilities. The second objective is detection of both 
undeclared activities at declared facilities, which is also technology dependent, and detection of 
undeclared activities outside of declared facilities, which is more of an intelligence-gathering 
issue and is largely technology independent. The goal is still to facilitate the timely detection of 
the production or use of nuclear materials by a state for other than peaceful purposes, whether 
through misuse of or diversion from a safeguarded facility, or by the use of undeclared materials, 
activities, or facilities which the state was required to declare. Part of the safeguards activity is to 
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provide assurance of non-diversion and the absence of undeclared materials, activities, and 
facilities. 
The extent to which safeguards are applied by the IAEA needs be to discussed, since that 
represents the extent of the monitoring and tracking needs, as summarized in the following.1 
IAEA Safeguards Glossary, Chapter  2.10. Coverage of IAEA safeguards 
— the scope of application defined by the relevant safeguards 
agreement. Under a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA), 
safeguards are applied on “all source or special fissionable material in 
all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State, under its 
jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere…” [153, para. 2]. 
Thus such agreements are considered comprehensive (or ‘full scope’). 
The scope of a CSA is not limited to the nuclear material declared by a 
State, but includes all nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards. 
Under an INFCIRC/66-type agreement, safeguards are applied only to 
the items specified in the agreement, which may include nuclear 
material, non-nuclear material, services, equipment, facilities and 
information. Under a voluntary offer agreement with a nuclear weapon 
State, safeguards are applied to the nuclear material and/or facilities 
specified in the agreement. 
2.11. Starting point of IAEA safeguards — the expression often used to 
refer to the point in a nuclear fuel cycle from which full safeguards 
requirements specified in comprehensive safeguards agreements start to 
apply to nuclear material. Under para. 34(c) of [153], the application of 
full safeguards requirements specified in the agreement begins when any 
nuclear material of a composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication 
or for being isotopically enriched leaves the plant or the process stage in 
which it has been produced, or when such nuclear material, or any other 
nuclear material produced at a later stage in the nuclear fuel cycle, is 
imported into a State. However, under paras 34(a) and 34(b) of [153], 
when the State exports to a nonnuclear-weapon State, or imports, any 
material containing uranium or thorium which has not reached the stage 
of the nuclear fuel cycle described in para. 34(c) of [153], the State is 
required to report such exports and imports to the IAEA, unless the 
material is transferred for specifically non-nuclear purposes. 
Furthermore, under Article 2.a.(vi) of [540], the State is required to 
provide the IAEA with information on source material which has not 
reached the composition and purity described in [153, para. 34(c)]. That 
information is to be provided both on such material present in the State, 
whether in nuclear or non-nuclear use, and on exports and imports of 
such material for specifically non-nuclear purposes. 
2.12. Termination of IAEA safeguards — safeguards in a given State 
normally continue on nuclear material (and subsequent generations of 
nuclear material produced therefrom) until the material is transferred to 
another State which has assumed the responsibility therefor, or until the 
material has been consumed or has been diluted in such a way that it is 
no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view 
of safeguards, or has become practicably irrecoverable. Under paras 13 
and 35 of [153] and para. 27 of [66], safeguards may be terminated for 
material transferred to non-nuclear use, such as the production of alloys 
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or ceramics. Paragraph 26 of [66] provides that termination is also 
possible in the case of the substitution of material not under safeguards 
for safeguarded material. Under Article 2.a.(viii) of [540], the State is to 
provide the IAEA with information regarding the location or further 
processing of intermediate or high level waste containing plutonium, 
high enriched uranium or 233U on which safeguards have been 
terminated. (See also No. 6.25.) 
1.1.2 IAEA Safeguards Approach 
Having defined the intent of safeguards and the extent to which safeguards would be applied 
in a state covered by a safeguards agreement, the IAEA then describes the approaches that are 
used in achieving the safeguards’ goals.1 
IAEA Safeguards Glossary, Chapter 3. SAFEGUARDS APPROACHES, 
CONCEPTS AND MEASURES 
Approaches to safeguards implementation are designed to allow the 
IAEA to meet the applicable safeguards objectives. What follows is an 
explanation of the basic concepts underlying the development and 
application of safeguards approaches at the level of the facility and the 
State, and the measures available to the IAEA under safeguards 
agreements and under additional protocols. 
3.1. Safeguards approach — a set of safeguards measures (see No. 3.6) 
chosen for the implementation of safeguards in a given situation in order 
to meet the applicable safeguards objectives (see No. 2.1). The 
safeguards approach takes into account the specific features of the 
safeguards agreement (or agreements) and, where applicable, whether 
the IAEA has drawn a conclusion of the absence of undeclared nuclear 
material and activities in the State (see No. 12.25). Safeguards 
approaches are developed for each facility under safeguards (see No. 
3.3). In addition, safeguards approaches may be developed for generic 
facility types (see No. 3.2) and, mainly under integrated safeguards (see 
No. 3.5), for the State as a whole (see No. 3.4). 
3.2. Model (generic) facility safeguards approach — the recommended 
approach for a particular facility type developed for a postulated 
reference plant. The approach specifies the IAEA inspection goals (see 
No. 3.22) and safeguards activities for that reference plant, taking into 
account relevant diversion assumptions; available safeguards measures 
(see No. 3.6), including the technical capabilities of those measures; 
facility design information (see No. 3.28) and facility practices (see No. 
3.27); the capabilities of the State system of accounting for and control 
of nuclear material (SSAC) (see No. 3.33); and the IAEA’s experience in 
safeguards implementation. Model safeguards approaches are developed 
for most of the common facility types. 
At this point, the IAEA expects to develop safeguards approaches for each facility based on 
the safeguards approach for reference plants, which it recognizes have been developed for most 
common facility types. The expectation is that as new facility types are developed, new model 
safeguards approaches will be developed that enable the safeguards goals to be met in those 
facilities: 
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IAEA Safeguards Glossary, Chapter 3.3. Facility safeguards approach 
— the approach selected for safeguards implementation at a specific 
facility, developed by adapting the model approach (where such exists) 
to account for actual conditions at the facility as compared with the 
reference plant. The provisions for implementing the facility safeguards 
approach are incorporated in the Subsidiary Arrangements (see No. 
1.26). 
Subsequently, the safeguards measures used in the safeguards approach are defined: 
IAEA Safeguards Glossary, Chapter 3.6. Safeguards measures — 
methods available to the IAEA under safeguards agreements and 
additional protocols based on [540] to achieve the applicable safeguards 
objectives (see No. 2.1). Paragraph 29 of [153] provides for the use of 
nuclear material accountancy as the safeguards measure of fundamental 
importance (see No. 6.1), with containment and surveillance as 
important complementary measures (see No. 8.6). These measures are 
applied for verifying that nuclear material inventories and flows are as 
declared by the State (and, under INFCIRC/66-type safeguards 
agreements, that non-nuclear material, services, equipment, facilities 
and information specified and placed under safeguards are not being 
used to further any proscribed purpose). Additional measures aimed at 
strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of 
safeguards were approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 
1992–1997. From a legal perspective, these measures may be 
categorized as follows: (a) measures that can be implemented under the 
existing legal authority of safeguards agreements (e.g. environmental 
sampling at locations to which IAEA inspectors have access during 
inspections and visits (see Nos 9.1 and 11.14)); and (b) measures that 
can only be implemented under the legal authority of additional 
protocols (e.g. complementary access (see No. 11.25)). 
As stated, the main purpose of the safeguards measures is to verify that the nuclear material 
inventories and flows (movement of materials) are as declared by the State. At this point, it is 
important to review why the material inventories and flows are the target of the safeguards 
measures. 
1.1.3 IAEA Diversion Detection and Timeliness 
The “timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful 
nuclear activities” requires definition of the amounts and times of interest. In determining time 
and quantity, other factors should be considered, as listed in the following from Ref. 1: 
IAEA Safeguards Glossary, Chapter 3.10. Diversion rate — the amount 
of nuclear material which could be diverted in a given unit of time. If the 
amount diverted is 1 SQ or more (see No. 3.14) of nuclear material in a 
short time (i.e. within a period that is less than the material balance 
period (see No. 6.47)), it is referred to as an ‘abrupt’ diversion. If the 
diversion of 1 SQ or more occurs gradually over a material balance 
period, with only small amounts removed at any one time, it is referred 
to as a ‘protracted’ diversion. 
3.13. Conversion time — the time required to convert different forms of 
nuclear material to the metallic components of a nuclear explosive 
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device. Conversion time does not include the time required to transport 
diverted material to the conversion facility or to assemble the device, or 
any subsequent period. The diversion activity is assumed to be part of a 
planned sequence of actions chosen to give a high probability of success 
in manufacturing one or more nuclear explosive devices with minimal 
risk of discovery until at least one such device is manufactured. The 
conversion time estimates applicable at present under these assumptions 
are provided in Table I. 
TABLE I. ESTIMATED MATERIAL CONVERSION TIMES FOR 
FINISHED Pu OR U METAL COMPONENTS 
Beginning material form Conversion time 
Pu, HEU or 233U metal Order of days (7–10) 
PuO2, Pu(NO3)4 or other pure Pu compounds; 
HEU or 233U oxide or other pure U compounds; 
MOX or other non-irradiated pure mixtures 
containing Pu, U (233U + 235U ≥ 20%); 
Pu, HEU and/or 233U in scrap or other 
miscellaneous impure compounds 
Order of weeks (1–3)a 
Pu, HEU or 233U in irradiated fuel Order of months (1–3) 
U containing <20% 235U and 233U; Th Order of months (3–12) 
a This range is not determined by any single factor but the pure Pu and U compounds will tend 
to be at the lower end of the range and the mixtures and scrap at the higher end. 
 
3.14. Significant quantity (SQ) — the approximate amount of nuclear 
material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive 
device cannot be excluded. Significant quantities take into account 
unavoidable losses due to conversion and manufacturing processes and 
should not be confused with critical masses. Significant quantities are 
used in establishing the quantity component of the IAEA inspection goal 
(see No. 3.23). Significant quantity values currently in use are given in 
Table II. 
TABLE II. SIGNIFICANT QUANTITIES 
Material SQ 
Direct use nuclear material  
Pua 8 kg Pu 
233U 8 kg 233U 
HEU (233U ≥ 20%) 25 kg 235U 
Indirect use nuclear material  
U (235U < 20%)b 75 kg 235U 
(or 10 t natural U 
or 20 t depleted U) 
Th 20 t Th 
a For Pu containing less than 80% 238Pu. 
b Including low enriched, natural and depleted uranium. 
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3.15. Detection time — the maximum time that may elapse between 
diversion of a given amount of nuclear material and detection of that 
diversion by IAEA safeguards activities. Where there is no additional 
protocol in force or where the IAEA has not drawn a conclusion of the 
absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State (see 
No. 12.25), it is assumed: (a) that all facilities needed to clandestinely 
convert the diverted material into components of a nuclear explosive 
device exist in a State; (b) that processes have been tested (e.g. by 
manufacturing dummy components using appropriate surrogate 
materials); and (c) that nonnuclear components of the device have been 
manufactured, assembled and tested. Under these circumstances, 
detection time should correspond approximately to estimated conversion 
times (see No. 3.13). Longer detection times may be acceptable in a State 
where the IAEA has drawn and maintained a conclusion of the absence 
of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Detection time is one 
factor used to establish the timeliness component of the IAEA inspection 
goal (see No. 3.24). 
3.16. Detection probability — the probability, if diversion of a given 
amount of nuclear material has occurred, that IAEA safeguards activities 
will lead to detection. The detection probability is usually denoted as 1 – 
β, with β being the non-detection probability (see No. 10.28). The 
detection probability for safeguards activities involving nuclear material 
accountancy can be quantified, and the accountancy detection 
probability 1 – βa is preselected as an input parameter for establishing 
sampling plans. The values of 1 – βa currently in use are 90% for ‘high’ 
and 20% for ‘low’ probability levels. 
3.17. False alarm probability — the probability, α , that statistical 
analysis of accountancy verification data would indicate that an amount 
of nuclear material is missing when, in fact, no diversion has occurred 
(see No. 10.27). For nuclear material accountancy purposes, α (or the 
associated critical region (see No. 10.32)) is preselected as one of the 
input parameters for designing sampling plans and performing statistical 
tests. It is usually set at 0.05 or less, in order to minimize the number of 
discrepancies (see No. 3.25) or false anomalies (see No. 3.26) that must 
be investigated. 
3.18. Inventory — the amount of nuclear material present at a facility or 
a location outside facilities (LOF). In the context of IAEA safeguards, the 
term ‘inventory’ is defined as the larger of: the maximum (running) 
inventory calculated from State reports (see Nos 12.5–12.8); or 
throughput, which is the estimated amount of material processed during 
the material balance period. This inventory is used for establishing the 
frequency and intensity of routine inspections for a facility or an LOF 
(see No. 11.16), as provided for in paras 79 and 80 of [153]. 
3.19. Annual throughput — “the amount of nuclear material transferred 
annually out of a facility working at nominal capacity” [153, para. 99]. 
Paragraph 84 of [66] defines throughput as “the rate at which nuclear 
material is introduced into a facility operating at full capacity.” 
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3.20. IAEA timeliness detection goal — the target detection times 
applicable to specific nuclear material categories (see No. 4.24). These 
goals are used for establishing the frequency of inspections (see No. 
11.16) and safeguards activities at a facility or a location outside 
facilities during a calendar year, in order to verify that no abrupt 
diversion (see No. 3.10) has occurred. Where there is no additional 
protocol in force or where the IAEA has not drawn and maintained a 
conclusion of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities 
in a State (see No. 12.25), the detection goals are as follows: 
—One month for unirradiated direct use material, 
—Three months for irradiated direct use material, 
—One year for indirect use material. 
Longer timeliness detection goals may be applied in a State where the 
IAEA has drawn and maintained a conclusion of the absence of 
undeclared nuclear material and activities in that State. 
Note that the IAEA defines “direct use material” as “nuclear material that can be used for the 
manufacture of nuclear explosive devices without transmutation or further enrichment.” It does 
not mean that the material can be directly used in its current form in a nuclear explosive device, 
but that chemical or other forms of processing may be required, such as separation from other 
elements and reduction of the oxide to metal. With this definition, any spent fuel would be 
characterized as direct-use material due to the presence of Pu-239, and the presence of the 
radiation field due to fission products and other elements only alters the goal detection time, 
increasing it from one month to three months. 
IAEA Safeguards Glossary, Chapter 3.22. IAEA inspection goal — 
performance targets specified for IAEA verification activities at a given 
facility as required to implement the facility safeguards approach (see 
No. 3.3). The inspection goal for a facility consists of a quantity 
component (see No. 3.23) and a timeliness component (see No. 3.24). 
These components are regarded as fully attained if all the Safeguards 
Criteria (see No. 3.21) relevant to the material types (see No. 4.23) and 
material categories (see No. 4.24) present at the facility have been 
satisfied and all anomalies involving 1 SQ or more of nuclear material 
have been resolved in a timely manner (see No. 3.26). (See also Nos 
12.23 and 12.25.) 
3.23. Quantity component of the IAEA inspection goal — relates to the 
scope of the inspection activities at a facility that are necessary for the 
IAEA to be able to draw the conclusion that there has been no diversion 
of 1 SQ or more of nuclear material over a material balance period and 
that there has been no undeclared production or separation of direct use 
material at the facility over that period. 
3.24. Timeliness component of the IAEA inspection goal — relates to the 
periodic activities that are necessary for the IAEA to be able to draw the 
conclusion that there has been no abrupt diversion (see No. 3.10) of 1 
SQ or more at a facility during a calendar year. 
3.26. Anomaly — an unusual observable condition which might result 
from diversion of nuclear material (see No. 2.3) or misuse of 
safeguarded items (see No. 2.4), or which frustrates or restricts the 
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ability of the IAEA to draw the conclusion that diversion or misuse has 
not occurred (see No. 12.25). Examples of possible anomalies would be: 
—Denial or restriction of IAEA inspector access for inspection (see No. 
11.14); 
—Unreported safeguards significant changes to facility design or 
operating conditions (see No. 3.28); 
—A discrepancy involving 1 SQ or more of nuclear material (see 
No. 3.25); 
—A significant departure from the agreed recording and reporting 
system (see No. 6.1); 
—Failure of the facility operator to comply with agreed measurement 
standards or sampling methods (see No. 6.1); 
—(For bulk handling facilities) a negative conclusion resulting from the 
evaluation of MUF (material unaccounted for), SRD (shipper/receiver 
difference) or other statistics (see No. 10.1); 
—IAEA seals on equipment detached by non-IAEA staff, lost or showing 
signs of tampering (see Nos 8.5 and 8.12); 
—Evidence of tampering with IAEA equipment (see No. 8.12). 
3.33. State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material 
(SSAC) — organizational arrangements at the national level which may 
have both a national objective to account for and control nuclear 
material in the State and an international objective to provide the basis 
for the application of IAEA safeguards under an agreement between the 
State and the IAEA (see No. 6.1). Under a comprehensive safeguards 
agreement, the State is required to establish and maintain a system of 
accounting for and control of nuclear material subject to safeguards 
under the agreement. The system “shall be based on a structure of 
material balance areas, and shall make provision...for the establishment 
of such measures as: 
(a) A measurement system for the determination of the quantities of 
nuclear material received, produced, shipped, lost or otherwise removed 
from inventory, and the quantities on inventory; 
(b) The evaluation of precision and accuracy of measurements and the 
estimation of measurement uncertainty; 
(c) Procedures for identifying, reviewing and evaluating differences in 
shipper/receiver measurements; 
(d) Procedures for taking a physical inventory; 
(e) Procedures for the evaluation of accumulations of unmeasured 
inventory and unmeasured losses; 
(f) A system of records and reports showing, for each material balance 
area, the inventory of nuclear material and the changes in that inventory 
including receipts into and transfers out of the material balance area; 
(g) Provisions to ensure that the accounting procedures and 
arrangements are being operated correctly; and 
(h) Procedures for the provisions of reports to the Agency” [153, para. 
32]. 
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INFCIRC/66-type safeguards agreements do not explicitly call for States 
to establish and maintain a system of accounting for and control of 
nuclear material, but the fact that [66] calls for agreement between the 
IAEA and the State on a “system of records” and a “system of reports” 
implies the need for an appropriate organizational arrangement at the 
State level. 
Before reviewing further details on nuclear material accountancy, it is important to note key 
features of the issues discussed in these sections from the IAEA: 
1. The system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials is based on the use of material 
balance areas, inventories, and material transfers, but the details appear to be the subject of an 
agreement rather than a specified technical basis that a state must follow. This is the point 
where the safeguards requirements are no longer generic, but are being postulated to suit the 
types of facilities currently existing, especially those used for processing. 
2. However, it is also stated that the intent of safeguards is always directed to allow the IAEA to 
draw the conclusion that diversion or misuse has not occurred. The basis for this conclusion 
is to require that one accurately find all of the materials to ensure that none are missing. Such 
an approach can be problematic in a large commercial facility. Note that this may not be the 
only way that one can justify a conclusion that no diversion or misuse had occurred, as will 
be discussed later in this report. 
3. Timeliness is based on several factors, including the type of material that could be diverted, 
the time required for the diversion, and the time required for conversion after the diversion. 
4. The quantity of concern also depends on the material being diverted and its form. 
1.1.4 IAEA Material Control and Accountancy 
One of the key distinctions for IAEA safeguards is between “item facilities” and “bulk 
handling facilities,” as follows:1 
IAEA Safeguards Glossary, Chapter 5.27. Item facility — a facility 
where all nuclear material is kept in item form and the integrity of the 
item remains unaltered during its residence at the facility. In such cases, 
IAEA safeguards are based on item accountancy procedures (e.g. item 
counting and identification, non-destructive measurements of nuclear 
material and the verification of the continued integrity of the items). 
Examples of item facilities are most reactors and critical assemblies 
(critical facilities), and storage installations for reactor fuel. 
5.28. Bulk handling facility — a facility where nuclear material is held, 
processed or used in bulk form. Where appropriate, bulk handling 
facilities may be organized for safeguards purposes into multiple 
material balance areas (MBAs), for instance by separating activities 
relating only to the storage and assembly of discrete fuel items from 
those involving storage or processing of bulk material. In a bulk MBA, 
flow and inventory values declared by the facility operator are verified 
by the IAEA through independent measurements and observation. 
Examples of bulk handling facilities are plants for conversion, 
enrichment (or isotope separation), fuel fabrication and spent fuel 
reprocessing, and storage facilities for bulk material. 
As stated, spent fuel processing facilities are considered bulk handling facilities and reactors 
are item facilities. 
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IAEA Safeguards Glossary, Chapter 6.1. Nuclear material accountancy 
— the practice of nuclear material accounting as implemented by the 
facility operator and the State system of accounting for and control of 
nuclear material (SSAC) (see No. 3.33), inter alia, to satisfy the 
requirements in the safeguards agreement between the IAEA and the 
State (or group of States); and as implemented by the IAEA, inter alia, to 
independently verify the correctness of the nuclear material accounting 
information in the facility records and the reports provided by the SSAC 
to the IAEA. Nuclear material accountancy may include the following: 
Facility level 
(a) Dividing operations involving nuclear material into material balance 
areas (MBAs) (see No. 6.4); 
(b) Maintaining records on the quantities of nuclear material held within 
each MBA; 
(c) Measuring and recording all transfers of nuclear material from one 
MBA to another or changes in the amount of nuclear material within 
MBAs due to, for example, nuclear production (see No. 6.17) or nuclear 
loss (see No. 6.22); 
(d) Determining periodically the quantities of nuclear material present 
within each MBA through the taking of the physical inventory (see No. 
6.41); 
(e) Closing the material balance over the period between two successive 
physical inventory takings and computing the material unaccounted for 
(MUF) (see No. 6.43) for that period; 
(f) Providing for a measurement control programme to determine the 
accuracy of calibrations and measurements (see No. 6.33) and the 
correctness of recorded source data (see No. 6.9) and batch data (see 
No. 6.8); 
(g) Testing the computed MUF against its limits of error for indications 
of any unrecorded nuclear loss or accidental gain (see Nos 6.22 and 
6.18); 
(h) Analysing the accounting information to determine the cause and 
magnitude of mistakes in recording unmeasured losses, accidental losses 
and unmeasured inventory (hold-up) (see No. 4.36). 
State Authority level 
(a) Preparing and submitting nuclear material accounting reports to the 
IAEA, as appropriate (see, for example, Nos 12.4–12.8); 
(b) Ensuring that nuclear material accounting procedures and 
arrangements are adhered to; 
(c) Providing for IAEA inspector access and co-ordination 
arrangements, as necessary, to enable the IAEA to carry out its 
verification activities; 
(d) Verifying facility operators’ nuclear material accountancy 
performance, as provided for in the SSAC regulations. 
IAEA level 
(a) Independently verifying nuclear material accounting information in 
facility records and State reports, and conducting activities as provided 
for in the safeguards agreement (see, for example, Nos 6.48–6.55); 
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(b) Determining the effectiveness of the SSAC (see No. 3.33); 
(c) Providing statements to the State on the IAEA’s verification activities 
(see, for example, Nos 13.2–13.8). 
A key concept in this approach is the use of the material balance area (MBA): 
IAEA Safeguards Glossary, Chapter 6.4. Material balance area (MBA) 
— as defined in para. 110 of [153], “an area in or outside of a facility 
such that: 
(a) The quantity of nuclear material in each transfer into or out of each 
‘material balance area’ can be determined; and 
(b) The physical inventory of nuclear material in each ‘material balance 
area’ can be determined when necessary, in accordance with specified 
procedures, in order that the material balance for Agency safeguards 
purposes can be established.” 
Paragraph 46(b) of [153] provides that design information made 
available to the IAEA shall be used: “To determine material balance 
areas to be used for Agency accounting purposes and to select those 
strategic points which are key measurement points and which will be 
used to determine the nuclear material flows and inventories; in 
determining such material balance areas the Agency shall, inter alia, use 
the following criteria: 
(i) The size of the material balance area should be related to the 
accuracy with which the material balance can be established; 
(ii) In determining the material balance area advantage should be taken 
of any opportunity to use containment and surveillance to help ensure 
the completeness of flow measurements and thereby simplify the 
application of safeguards and concentrate measurement efforts at key 
measurement points; 
(iii) A number of material balance areas in use at a facility or at distinct 
sites may be combined into one material balance area to be used for 
Agency accounting purposes when the Agency determines that this is 
consistent with its verification requirements; and 
(iv) If the State so requests, a special material balance area around a 
process step involving commercially sensitive information may be 
established.” 
Containment and surveillance are introduced to augment the information collected about flow 
measurements and inventories to “simplify the application of safeguards and concentrate 
measurement efforts at key measurement points.” The extended use of containment and 
surveillance will be discussed later in this report as a means of meeting safeguards goals. This is 
connected to the establishment of strategic points and key measurement points to verify the 
safeguards measures. 
IAEA Safeguards Glossary, Chapter 6.5. Strategic point — “a location 
selected during examination of design information where, under normal 
conditions and when combined with the information from all ‘strategic 
points’ taken together, the information necessary and sufficient for the 
implementation of safeguards measures is obtained and verified; a 
‘strategic point’ may include any location where key measurements 
related to material balance accountancy are made and where 
containment and surveillance measures are executed” [153, para. 116]. 
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IAEA Safeguards Glossary, Chapter 6.6. Key measurement point (KMP) 
— “a location where nuclear material appears in such a form that it may 
be measured to determine material flow or inventory. ‘Key measurement 
points’ thus include, but are not limited to, the inputs and outputs 
(including measured discards) and storages in material balance areas” 
[153, para. 108]. 
The expectations of what can be achieved for the measurements are provided, based on 
previous industrial experience with existing facilities. 
IAEA Safeguards Glossary, Chapter 6.35. International standards of 
accountancy — values of the measurement uncertainty δE expected for 
closing a material balance. These values, which are based on operating 
experience at the various types of bulk handing facility, are considered 
achievable under the condition of normal operation. For calculating the 
international standard for the uncertainty of a material balance, the 
standard from Table III (expressed as a relative standard deviation) is 
multiplied by the throughput. The δE values can be used along with the 
International Target Values (see No. 6.36) to determine whether a 
facility’s measurement system meets international standards. 
TABLE III. EXPECTED MEASUREMENT UNCERTAINTY δE 
(RELATIVE STANDARD DEVIATION) ASSOCIATED WITH 
CLOSING A MATERIAL BALANCE 
Bulk handling facility type δE 
Uranium enrichment 0.002 
Uranium fabrication 0.003 
Plutonium fabrication 0.005 
Uranium reprocessing 0.008 
Plutonium reprocessing 0.010 
Separate scrap storage 0.04 
Separate waste storage 0.25 
 
IAEA Safeguards Glossary, Chapter 6.36. International Target Values 
(ITV) — target values for random and systematic measurement 
uncertainty components for destructive analysis (DA) (see No. 7.13) and 
non-destructive assay (NDA) (see No. 7.24) measurements performed on 
nuclear material. The values are expressed as per cent relative standard 
deviations, and are values for uncertainties associated with a single 
determination result; for example, this may be the result reported by one 
laboratory on one sample (independent of the analytical scheme applied 
internally in the laboratory), or the result of an NDA measurement 
performed on a single item. The values are based on actual practical 
measurement experiences and are intended to be used as a reference for 
routinely achievable measurement quality by facility operators, SSACs 
and the IAEA. The values are periodically updated to reflect currently 
achievable measurement capabilities and to incorporate newly 
developed measurement techniques and instruments. The currently used 
set of values (ITV 2000) was published as [STR-327]. 
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At this point, it is possible to illustrate one of the potential difficulties with this approach to 
safeguards. If one is examining a commercial-scale facility for the processing of spent light-water 
reactor (LWR) fuel, with an assumed annual throughput of 800 MTIHM/year, the facility would 
be handling approximately 8–10 MT of plutonium annually, depending on the discharge burnup 
of the fuel. If one assumes 200 days of operation per year, this translates to about 40–50 kg of 
plutonium per day. At a standard deviation of 1% for closing the material balance, the error 
would be equivalent to 400–500 grams of plutonium per day, or it would only take about 16–20 
days for the allowable error to equal 1 SQ. While the actual situation is more complicated than 
this example implies, the relative magnitude of the problem highlights the difficulties of trying to 
detect diversion of 1 SQ in large-capacity facilities. The IAEA recognizes this issue and accepts 
that the detection quantity goal may be several SQs, so that detection of diversion of 1 SQ would 
be done with lower probability.2 
In bulk handling plants, verification requires measurement of large 
quantities of nuclear materials of different physical forms and chemical 
composition including materials of low quality such as scrap or waste. 
No instrument or measurement procedure ever ensures complete 
accuracy, and there are inevitably measurement uncertainties. Today 
these uncertainties are generally of the order of 1% of the total amount 
of nuclear material measured or sampled. It should be emphasized that 
this measurement uncertainty does not reflect an actual physical loss or 
gain of material. One per cent of the inventory or throughput of a large 
bulk handling facility may be larger than 1 SQ — in some cases 
considerably larger. It would, however, be unreasonable to set a target 
that cannot be technically achieved today, and this uncertainty must be 
taken into account in setting the final inspection goals. 
 Finally, it should be borne in mind that the adoption of a detection goal 
of several SQ does not mean that the diversion of a single SQ or even 
smaller quantities could not be detected at all. Detection is possible also 
in this case, but with a smaller probability. 
The situation is obviously not entirely satisfactory and the limitations of 
nuclear materials accounting must be offset by the development of 
effective containment and surveillance measures and by improving the 
techniques for measuring and accounting for nuclear materials. 
The IAEA also acknowledges that large facilities may require full-time inspectors during 
operation to provide continuity of knowledge as a partial substitute for the potentially large 
amounts of material that could be contained in the balance errors.2 
In the case of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, the inspection 
goals are set at two to three weeks, i.e. at the upper end of the range 
recommended by [Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards 
Implementation] SAGSI. If the material is moving through the plant (e.g. 
in a reprocessing or fabrication plant) these goals are met as far as 
possible by frequent partial inventory-taking carried out in such a way 
as to minimize disturbance of plant operation. At some larger plants the 
IAEA also requires the continuous presence of inspectors to verify the 
internal flow of nuclear material, and thus to achieve the timeliness goal. 
Thus it can be seen that even the current approaches may be viewed as less than desirable, but 
given that this is the best that can be achieved within the limitations of the technology and 
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measurements, it is sufficient given that the goal of safeguards is to provide assurance that no 
diversion or misuse has taken place. 
There are more details related to specific features of the IAEA safeguards approach, but this 
brief review is sufficient to provide the background for discussions on alternative methods of 
performing safeguards using the inherent characteristics of advanced technologies. 
1.2 Domestic Safeguards: The NRC 
The requirements for safeguards for domestic facilities are listed in Title 10 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations (10 CFR), mainly in Part 75, “Safeguards on Nuclear Material 
Implementation of US/IAEA Agreement.” This part shows that the NRC will establish safeguards 
requirements, including material control and accountability, for domestic commercial facilities as 
expressed in the agreement with the IAEA (material control and accountability for facilities that 
are not covered by a US/IAEA agreement is discussed in Part 74). Part 75 starts with a discussion 
of the state system of accounting and control, as referred to in the previous section on IAEA 
requirements:3 
§ 75.1 Purpose. 
This part establishes a system of nuclear material accounting and 
nuclear material control to implement, with respect NRC and Agreement 
State licensees, the Agreement between the United States and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the Application of 
Safeguards in the United States. 
§ 75.2 Scope. 
(a) Except as provided in § 75.3, the requirements in this part apply to 
all persons licensed by the Commission or Agreement States to possess 
source or special nuclear material at an installation, as defined in § 
75.4(k), on the United States eligible list. They also apply, to the extent 
specified in §§ 50.78, 40.31(g), 70.21(g), and 150.17a of this chapter, to 
holders of construction permits and to persons who intend to receive 
source material or special nuclear material. 
(b) The United States eligible list is a list of installations eligible for 
IAEA safeguards under the US/IAEA Safeguards Agreement which the 
Secretary of State or his designee files with the Commission. A copy of 
this list is available for inspection at the NRC Web site, 
http://www.nrc.gov, and/or at the NRC Public Document Room. In 
accordance with the provisions of the Agreement, the following activities 
are excluded from the United States eligible list: 
(1) Activities having direct national security significance. 
(2) Activities involving mining and ore processing. 
Given the scope of the IAEA agreement, it is likely that any commercial facility, whether a 
nuclear reactor or an advanced spent fuel processing plant, would be on the eligible list for IAEA 
safeguards. In this respect, the NRC does not appear to have goals for safeguards in addition to 
those expressed by the IAEA. 
Part 75.11 contains all of the information collection requirements that the NRC imposes on 
the licensees that are needed to satisfy the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, including identifying the 
features for material control and accountability, containment, and surveillance, as shown in the 
underlined sections. The loss limits and changes to containment are included in facility 
attachments as described in Part 75.8, with the section underlined. 3 
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§ 75.11 Installation information. 
(a) Each licensee subject to the provisions of this part shall submit 
installation information, in response to a written request from the 
Commission, with respect to any installation which the Commission 
indicates has been identified under the Agreement and in which the 
licensee carries out licensed activities. (The Commission request shall 
state whether the installation has been identified under Article 39(b) of 
the principal text of the Agreement or Article 2(a) of the Protocol.) The 
licensee shall submit such information to the Commission within the 
period, which shall be at least 45 days, specified in the Commission’s 
request. 
(b) Installation information includes: 
(1) The identification of the installation, stating its general 
character, purpose, nominal capacity (thermal power level, in the 
case of power reactors), and geographic location, and the name and 
address to be used for routine purposes; 
(2) A description of the general arrangement of the installation with 
reference, to the extent feasible, to the form, location and flow of 
nuclear material, and to the general layout of important items of 
equipment which use, produce, or process nuclear material; 
(3) A description of features of the installation relating to material 
accounting, containment, and surveillance; and 
(4) A description of the existing and proposed procedures at the 
installation for nuclear material accounting and control, with special 
reference to material balance areas established by the licensee, 
measurement of flow, and procedures for physical inventory taking. 
(As part of this description, the licensee may identify a process step 
involving information which it deems to be commercially sensitive 
and for which it proposes that a special material balance area be 
established so as to restrict IAEA access to such information.) 
(c) Each licensee shall thereafter submit to the Commission information 
with respect to any modification at the installation affecting the 
information referred to in paragraph (a) of this section. Such 
information shall be submitted: 
(1) With respect to a modification of a type described in the license 
conditions: At least 70 days before the modification is scheduled to 
be completed, except that in an emergency or other unforeseen 
situation a shorter period may be approved by the Commission. 
(2) With respect to any other modification relevant to the application 
of the provisions of the Agreement: At the time the first inventory 
change report is submitted after the modification is completed. 
(d) The information specified in paragraphs (a) and (c) of this section 
shall be prepared on Form N-71 or other forms supplied by the 
Commission (including appropriate IAEA Design Information 
Questionnaire forms). The information shall be sufficiently detailed to 
enable knowledgeable determinations to be made in the development of 
Facility Attachments or amendments thereto, including: 
(1) Identification of the features of installations and nuclear material 
relevant to the application of safeguards to nuclear material in 
sufficient detail to facilitate verification; 
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(2) Determination of IAEA material balance areas to be used for 
IAEA accounting purposes and selection of those strategic points 
which are key measurement points and which will be used to 
determine flow and inventory of nuclear material; 
(3) Establishment of the nominal timing and procedures for taking of 
physical inventory of nuclear material for IAEA accounting 
purposes; 
(4) Establishment of the records and reports requirements and 
records evaluation procedures; 
(5) Establishment of requirements and procedures for verification of 
the quantity and location of nuclear material; and 
(6) Selection of appropriate combinations of containment and 
surveillance methods and techniques at the strategic points at which 
they are to be applied. 
(e) The licensee’s detailed security measures for the physical protection 
of an installation shall be included in the installation information only 
when and to the extent specifically requested by the Commission. 
§ 75.4 Definitions. (edited) 
(d) Batch means a portion of nuclear material handled as a unit for 
accounting purposes at a key measurement point and for which the 
composition and quantity are defined by a single set of specifications or 
measurements. The nuclear material may be in bulk form or contained in 
a number of separate items. 
(e) Containment (the term refers to nuclear material safeguards rather 
than radiological protection) means: 
(1) The application of any devices designed to limit the mobility of 
nuclear material, the access of personnel, or the unauthorized 
operation of equipment such as transfer valves and sampler lines; 
and 
(2) Structural elements, including the design of buildings and layout 
of equipment, which minimize and control access to nuclear 
material. 
(f) Effective kilogram means a unit used in safeguarding nuclear 
material. The quantity is: 
(1) For special nuclear material: The amount specified in § 70.4 of 
this chapter. 
(2) For source material: The amount specified in § 40.4(q) of this 
chapter. 
(g) Facility Attachment means that portion of the Subsidiary 
Arrangements to the principal text of the Agreement that pertains to a 
particular installation that has been identified pursuant to Article 39(b) 
thereof. 
(h) IAEA means the International Atomic Energy Agency or its duly 
authorized representatives. 
(i) IAEA material balance area means an area established for IAEA 
accounting purposes, such that: 
(1) The quantity of nuclear material in each transfer into or out of 
each material balance area can be determined; and 
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(2) The physical inventory of nuclear material in each material 
balance area can be determined when necessary in accordance with 
specified procedures. 
(l) Inventory change means an increase or decrease, established in 
accordance with the procedures required by this part, in terms of batches 
of nuclear material in an IAEA material balance area. 
(m) Key measurement point means a location where nuclear material 
appears in such a form that it may be measured to determine material 
flow or inventory. Key measurement points thus include, but are not 
limited to, the inputs and outputs (including measured discards) and 
storages in material balance areas. 
(n) Nuclear material means any source material or any special nuclear 
material. 
(p) Surveillance means instrumental or human observation to indicate or 
detect the movement of nuclear material. 
§ 75.8 Facility attachments. 
(a) The Facility Attachment or Transitional Facility Attachment will 
document the determinations referred to in § 75.11 and will contain such 
other provisions as may be appropriate. 
(b) The Commission will issue license amendments, as necessary, for 
implementation of the principal text of the Agreement and the Facility 
Attachment (as amended from time to time). The license amendments 
through reference to the Facility Attachment or Transitional Facility 
Attachment, or otherwise, will specify: 
(1) IAEA material balance areas; 
(2) Types of modifications with respect to which information is 
required, under § 75.11, to be submitted in advance; 
(3) Procedures, as referred to in § 75.21; 
(4) The extent to which isotopic composition must be included in 
batch data (under § 75.22) and advance notification (§ 75.45); 
(5) Items to be reported in the concise notes accompanying inventory 
change reports, as referred to in § 75.34; 
(6) Loss limits and changes in containment, as referred to in § 75.36 
(pertaining to special reports); 
(7) Actions required to be taken, in accordance with § 75.42(e)(2), at 
the request of an IAEA inspector; 
(8) Procedures to be used for documentation of requests under § 
75.46 (pertaining to expenses); and 
(9) Such other matters as may be appropriate. 
(c) The Commission will also issue license amendments, as necessary, 
for implementation of the Protocol to the Agreement and the Transitional 
Facility Attachment (as amended from time to time). 
(d) License amendments will be made in accordance with the 
Commission’s rules of practice (part 2 of this chapter). Specifically, if 
the licensee does not agree to an amendment, an order modifying the 
license would be issued under § 2.204. 
(e) Subject to constraints imposed by the Agreement, the Commission 
will afford the licensee a reasonable opportunity to participate in the 
development of the Facility Attachment or Transitional Facility 
Attachments applicable to the licensee’s installation, and any 
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amendments thereto, and to review and comment upon any such 
instrument before it has been agreed to by the United States. The 
Commission will provide to the licensee a copy of any such instrument 
that has been completed in accordance with the Agreement. 
An interesting component of the process is that the licensee will have input to the 
development of the facility attachments, which presumably would include specifications for items 
like loss limits and reporting, prior to formal agreement with the IAEA. 
It is useful to note the similarities between the NRC requirements and the IAEA requirements 
as listed in Chapter I-C of this report, identified as section 3.33. The remainder of Part 75 is 
devoted to descriptions of the other details related to the IAEA safeguards agreement. For 
material control and accounting, the general requirements are listed in 75.21: 
§ 75.21 General requirements. 
(a) Each licensee who has been given notice by the Commission in 
writing that its installation has been identified under the Agreement shall 
establish, maintain, and follow written material accounting and control 
procedures. The licensee shall retain as a record current material 
accounting and control procedures until the Commission terminates the 
license for the installation involved with the request or until the 
Commission notifies the licensee that the licensee is no longer under the 
agreement. Superseded material must be retained for three years after 
each change is made. 
(b) The material accounting and control procedures required by 
paragraph (a) of this section shall include, as appropriate: 
(1) A measurement system for the determination of the quantities of 
nuclear material received, produced, shipped, lost or otherwise 
removed from inventory, and the quantities on inventory; 
(2) The evaluation of precision and accuracy of measurements and 
the estimation of measurement uncertainty; 
(3) Procedures for identifying, reviewing and evaluating differences 
in shipper/receiver measurements; 
(4) Procedures, including frequency, for taking a physical inventory; 
(5) Procedures for the evaluation of accumulations of unmeasured 
inventory and unmeasured losses; and 
(6) A system of accounting and operating records. 
(c) 
(1) The procedures shall, unless otherwise specified in license 
conditions, conform to the installation information submitted by the 
licensee under § 75.11. 
(2) Until installation information has been submitted by the licensee, 
the procedures shall be sufficient to document changes in the 
quantity of nuclear material in or at its installation. Observance of 
the procedures described in §§ 40.61 or 74.15 of this chapter (or the 
corresponding provisions of the regulations of an Agreement State) 
by any licensee subject thereto shall constitute compliance with this 
paragraph. 
(d) The requirements of this section are in addition to any other 
requirements of this chapter, relating to material accounting and 
control, that may apply to the licensee. 
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[45 FR 50711, July 31, 1980, as amended at 53 FR 19263, May 27, 
1988; 67 FR 78149, Dec. 23, 2002] 
The definition of special nuclear material for the NRC is contained in Part 70.4: 
Special nuclear material means (1) plutonium, uranium 233, uranium 
enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any other material 
which the Commission, pursuant to the provisions of section 51 of the 
act, determines to be special nuclear material, but does not include 
source material; or (2) any material artificially enriched by any of the 
foregoing but does not include source material; 
Special nuclear material of low strategic significance means: 
(1) Less than an amount of special nuclear material of moderate 
strategic significance as defined in paragraph (1) of the definition of 
strategic nuclear material of moderate strategic significance in this 
section, but more than 15 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium 
enriched to 20 percent or more in U-235 isotope) or 15 grams of 
uranium-233 or 15 grams of plutonium or the combination of 15 grams 
when computed by the equation, grams = (grams contained U-235) + 
(grams plutonium) + (grams U-233); or 
(2) Less than 10,000 grams but more than 1,000 grams of uranium-235 
(contained in uranium enriched to 10 percent or more but less than 20 
percent in the U-235 isotope); or 
(3) 10,000 grams or more of uranium-235 (contained in uranium 
enriched above natural but less than 10 percent in the U-235 isotope). 
This class of material is sometimes referred to as a Category III quantity 
of material. 
Special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance means: 
(1) Less than a formula quantity of strategic special nuclear material but 
more than 1,000 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched 
to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope) or more than 500 grams of 
uranium-233 or plutonium, or in a combined quantity of more than 1,000 
grams when computed by the equation, grams = (grams contained U-
235) + 2 (grams U-233 + grams plutonium); or 
(2) 10,000 grams or more of uranium-235 (contained in uranium 
enriched to 10 percent or more but less than 20 percent in the U-235 
isotope). This class of material is sometimes referred to as a Category II 
quantity of material. 
Special nuclear material scrap means the various forms of special 
nuclear material generated during chemical and mechanical processing, 
other than recycle material and normal process intermediates, which are 
unsuitable for use in their present form, but all or part of which will be 
used after further processing. 
Strategic special nuclear material means uranium-235 (contained in 
uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope), uranium-
233, or plutonium. 
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Formula quantity means strategic special nuclear material in any 
combination in a quantity of 5000 grams or more computed by the 
formula, grams = (grams contained U-235) + 2.5 (grams U-233 + 
grams plutonium). This class of material is sometimes referred to as a 
Category I quantity of material. 
Effective kilograms of special nuclear material means: (1) For 
plutonium and uranium-233 their weight in kilograms; (2) For uranium 
with an enrichment in the isotope U-235 of 0.01 (1%) and above, its 
element weight in kilograms multiplied by the square of its enrichment 
expressed as a decimal weight fraction; and (3) For uranium with an 
enrichment in the isotope U-235 below 0.01 (1%), by its element weight 
in kilograms multiplied by 0.0001. 
In summary, while there are differences in some of the details, especially in identifying the 
materials of concern and the manner in which the amounts are calculated, the NRC appears to 
have basically the same general safeguards requirements as the IAEA. 
1.3 Domestic Safeguards: U.S. DOE 
Safeguards within the DOE are part of Integrated Safeguards and Security Management, as 
described by DOE Orders in the 470 group. Safeguards includes the same concepts of physical 
protection, material control, and accountability. The material control and accountability 
requirements and procedures are discussed in DOE M 470.4-6, “to establish a program for the 
control and accountability of nuclear materials within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), 
including the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).” The general guidelines are 
similar to those discussed above for the IAEA and the NRC, as stated in Section A of DOE M 
470.4-6 (Ref 4): 
GENERAL. This Chapter provides minimum requirements for 
implementing a nuclear material control and accountability (MC&A) 
program at Department of Energy (DOE) facilities and for DOE- owned 
materials at other facilities that are exempt from licensing by the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). DOE line management and 
site/facility operators must consider MC&A requirements, systems, 
technologies, and activities when planning, designing, constructing, and 
operating new or renovated DOE facilities. The site/facility operator 
must use techniques and equipment that maximize material loss detection 
sensitivity, increase the quality of accountability measurements, 
minimize material holdup, and reduce the magnitude of inventory 
differences and associated control limits consistent with the 
consequences of the loss of the material. 
a. An MC&A program must be established and maintained for all 
materials identified in Table I-1, Nuclear Materials. The level of 
control and accountability must be graded based on the consequence 
of their loss. 
b. Special nuclear material (SNM) must not be received, processed, or 
stored at a facility until a facility approval has been granted. 
c. MC&A programs must be designed to deter and detect theft and 
diversion of nuclear material by both outside and inside adversaries. 
d. A performance testing program to verify MC&A procedures and 
practices and to demonstrate that material controls are effective 
must be established. 
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e. MC&A programs must address both the theft and diversion of SNM 
and the unauthorized control of a weapon, test device, or materials 
that can be used to make an improvised nuclear device. 
DOE uses a “graded” safeguards approach for characterizing the quantities of material, which 
means that the safeguards requirements are different depending on the type and amount of 
material and different requirements are assigned to each category, as defined in Table I-4 from 
DOE M 470.4-6. This is reflected in varying limits for inventory balances, depending on the 
category of material:4 
(7) Inventory Difference Control Limits. 
(a) For Category I and II MBAs, limits-of-error must not exceed 2 
percent of the active inventory during the inventory period or a Category 
II quantity of material. 
(b) For Category III and IV MBAs, limits-of-error of inventory 
differences must not exceed a specified percentage of the active inventory 
during the inventory period to a maximum of a specified quantity; the 
specified percentage and maximum quantity must be approved by the 
DOE cognizant security authority. 
(c) For purposes of the performances requirements (a) and (b), the term 
“active inventory” means the sum of additions to inventory, beginning 
inventory, ending inventory, inventory adjustments, and removals from 
inventory after all “common terms” have been excluded (in this context, 
“common terms” are material values that appear in the active inventory 
calculation more than once and come from the same measurement). 
For Category I and II materials, the limit for the inventory difference on the mass balance in 
the MBA is 2% of the active inventory or a Category II quantity. This is essentially the same 
approach taken by the IAEA, where the goal is to detect 1 SQ, with an allowable standard 
deviation on the measurements of 1% of inventory; however, there is a finer distinction between 
the types of materials and the amounts of concern for each type of material. 
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Table 1. Nuclear Materials. 
Material Type 
SNM, 
Source, or 
Other 
Reportable 
Quantity* 
Weight Field 
Used for 
Element 
Weight Field Used 
for Isotope 
Material 
Type Code 
Depleted Uranium (U)  source  kilogram  total U  U-235  10 
Enriched Uranium  SNM  gram  total U  U-235  20 
Normal Uranium  source  kilogram  total U  —  81 
Uranium-233  SNM  gram  total U  U-233  70 
Plutonium-2421 (Pu)  SNM  gram  total Pu  Pu-242  40 
Plutonium-239-241  SNM  gram  total Pu  Pu-239 + Pu-241  50 
Plutonium-2382  SNM  tenth of a gram  total Pu  Pu-238  83 
Americium2413 (Am)  other  gram  total Am  Am-241  44 
Americium-2433  other  gram  total Am  Am-243  45 
Berkelium6 (Bk)  other  microgram  —  Bk-249  47 
Californium-252 (Cf)  other  microgram  —  Cf-252  48 
Curium (Cm)  other  gram  total Cm  Cm-246  46 
Deuterium4 (D)  other  tenth of a 
kilogram  
D2O  D2  86 
Enriched Lithium (Li)  other  kilogram  total Li  Li-6  60 
Neptunium-237 (Np)3  other  gram  total Np  —  82 
Thorium (Th)  source  kilogram  total Th  —  88 
Tritium5 (H-3)  other  gram  total H-3  —  87 
Uranium in Cascades  SNM  gram  total U  U-235  89 
* Reportable quantity is the minimum amount of material subject to the requirements of this Manual. Facilities with less than a 
reportable quantity of a material are exempt from the requirements of the manual for that material. Facilities with more than 
reportable quantities are to report transactions that exceed a reporting unit or more of material. Reporting unit is the mass unit 
that facility/site nuclear materials accounting systems must use for recording and reporting inventories and transactions. 
1. Report as Pu-242 if the contained Pu-242 is 20 percent or greater of total plutonium by weight; otherwise, report as Pu-239-241. 
2. Report as Pu-238 if the contained Pu-238 is 10 percent or greater of total plutonium by weight; otherwise, report as Pu-239-241. 
3. Americium and Neptunium-237 contained in plutonium as part of the natural in-growth process are not required to be accounted 
for or reported until separated from the plutonium. 
4. For deuterium in the form of heavy water, both the element and isotope weight fields will be used; otherwise, report isotope 
weight only. 
5. Tritium contained in water (H2O or D2O) used as a moderator in a nuclear reactor is not an accountable material. 
6. Berkelium must be accounted for at the site level. It is not required that it be reported to Nuclear Materials Management 
Safeguards System (NMMSS). 
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Table 2. Graded Safeguards. 
Pu/U-233 Category (kg) 
Contained U-235/Separated Np237/Separated 
Am-241 and -243 Category (kg) 
 
Attractiveness 
Level I II III IV I II III IV 
All E 
Materials 
Category 
IV 
WEAPONS Assembled weapons and test 
devices  
A  All  N/A  N/A  N/A  All  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
PURE PRODUCTS Pits, major 
components, button ingots, recastable 
metal, directly convertible materials  
B  ≥2  ≥0.4 < 2 ≥0.2 < 0.4  <0.2  ≥5  ≥1 < 5  ≥0.4 < 1 <0.4  N/A  
HIGH-GRADE MATERIALS Carbides, 
oxides, nitrates, solutions (>25 g/L) etc.; 
fuel elements and assemblies; alloys and 
mixtures; UF4 or UF6 ( > 50% enriched)  
C  ≥6  ≥2 < 6  ≥0.4 < 2  <0.4  ≥20  ≥6 < 20  ≥2 < 6  <2  N/A  
LOW-GRADE MATERIALS Solutions (1 
to 25 g/L), process residues requiring 
extensive reprocessing; moderately 
irradiated material; Pu-238 (except waste); 
UF4 or UF6 (> 20% < 50% enriched)  
D  N/A  ≥16  ≥3 < 16  <3  N/A  ≥50  ≥8 < 50  <8  N/A  
ALL OTHER MATERIALS Highly 
irradiated forms, solutions (<1 g/L), 
uranium containing <20% U-235 or <10% 
U-233 (any form, any quantity)  
E  N/A  N/A  N/A  Reportable 
Quantities  
N/A  N/A  N/A  Reportable 
Quantities  
Reportable 
Quantities  
1. The lower limit for Category IV is equal to reportable quantities in this Manual. 
2. The total quantity of U-233 = [Contained U-233 + Contained U-235]. The category is determined by using the Pu/U-233 side of this table. 
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The concern then becomes determining how often the material balances should be taken to ensure that 
the expected loss of material, given the accuracy of measurements within the system, does not exceed 
either 2% of active inventory or a Category II quantity. For example, one SQ for the IAEA is 8 kg of 
plutonium, while the Category II quantity of plutonium oxide for the DOE would be 6 kg. As described 
above, the IAEA requirements would necessitate balance periods of less than 16–20 days for the example 
of a processing plant of 800 MT/yr capacity operating 200 days/year. For the same example, if the 
requirement is to detect the Category II quantity, 6 kg, with an allowable 2% limit of error on the 
inventory difference, this would require a balance period of 6–8 days. In this sense, the DOE approach 
would require more frequent balances due to the smaller allowable loss amount and the larger allowable 
error in the inventory difference, but the principle is basically the same. 
1.4 Summary of Safeguard Goals 
The safeguards goals for the IAEA, NRC, and the U.S. DOE can be summarized as follows: 
IAEA The fundamental objective is “the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of 
nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or 
of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such 
diversion by the risk of early detection.” This goal is achieved by detecting the loss of 1 
SQ, with timeliness determined by the type of material, either 1 month for unirradiated 
direct-use material or 3 months for irradiated direct-use material, where direct-use material 
is defined as material which can be used without further enrichment or irradiation. The 
goal is to be able to conclude that no diversion has occurred. 
NRC Basically the same as the IAEA requirements, since the NRC-licensed commercial 
facilities would be placed under IAEA safeguards. 
DOE Essentially the same concept as for the IAEA although the objectives are stated as 
maximizing the material loss sensitivity, but with different detection quantities and larger 
allowable limit of error on the inventory difference: 2% for DOE vs. 1% for IAEA (and 
NRC). However, the DOE requires any operator to reduce the magnitude of inventory 
differences and associated control limits consistent with the consequences of the loss of the 
material, which could imply that while the allowable limits of error on the inventory 
difference are given, the operator must also be able to show that he is using the best 
practices available to lower these below the limits. 
 
As with the approach taken by the IAEA and NRC, in order to achieve the goal of being able to 
conclude that no loss or diversion has occurred, the basic principle is that one must be able to verify the 
presence of all of the nuclear materials of interest to within the acceptable limits of uncertainty. However, 
there may be other approaches for concluding that no loss or diversion has occurred, depending on the 
characteristics of the systems being safeguarded. That is the subject of the next section of this report. 
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2. AN ADVANCED SPENT FUEL PROCESSING 
TECHNOLOGY EXAMPLE 
As part of the DOE AFCI program and earlier programs, advanced spent fuel processing technologies 
are being developed that provide additional separations and waste-stream differentiation as compared to 
typical plutonium-uranium extraction (PUREX) processing in order to achieve recycling and waste 
disposal goals. One of these advanced technologies is pyroprocessing, also referred to as electrochemical 
processing. The basic features of this processing technology are summarized in the following sections. 
2.1 Description of Pyroprocessing 
Pyroprocessing is fundamentally different from aqueous processing in that only non-aqueous steps 
are used, with molten salts being the medium of choice in the AFCI program, operating at elevated 
temperatures due to the relatively high melting points of the process salts. In addition, all of the 
operations can be performed using discrete operations in separate pieces of equipment. This is in contrast 
to the flowing system typically used with PUREX separations technology and offers the opportunity to 
use a different approach for safeguards. 
A concept for pyroprocessing spent LWR fuel is shown in Figure 1, followed by a list of the 
processing operations and material flows. 
 
Figure 1. An example of the operations and material flow for pyroprocessing of spent LWR fuel. 
Path Contents: 
1. Segments of spent LWR fuel, as chopped (spent oxide fuel, fission products, cladding hulls, and 
assembly hardware) 
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2. Segments of spent LWR fuel, with tritium and some fission product gases removed  
3. Volatile fission products such as tritium, xenon, and krypton 
4. Segments of spent LWR fuel, with all elements reduced from the oxide (elements from spent oxide 
fuel, fission products, cladding hulls, assembly hardware, and adhering LiCl salt from the electrolytic 
reduction vessel) 
5. Additional volatile fission product amounts released during reduction step 
6. Uranium metal product recovered at the cathode with adhering electrorefiner (ER) salt, which 
contains U/TRU and more chemically active fission products 
7. Remaining anode basket contents (cladding hulls and assembly hardware, less chemically active 
fission product elements) with adhering electrorefiner salt (contains U/TRU and more chemically 
active fission products) 
8. Uranium metal ingot 
9. Recovered electrorefiner salt that adhered to the uranium product 
10. Uranium/TRU metal product with adhering salt 
11. Recovered electrorefiner salt that adhered to anode basket contents 
12. Metal ingot containing cladding materials, assembly hardware, and less chemically active fission 
products 
13. Recovered U/TRU recovery vessel salt from the U/TRU metal product 
14. Metal ingot containing uranium and transuranic elements (about 50/50) 
15. Remaining U/TRU recovery vessel salt  
16. U/TRU recovery vessel salt after U/TRU drawdown  
17. Residual U/TRU metal contaminated with lanthanide metal after U/TRU drawdown 
18. Salt from the lanthanide metal recovery process returned to the electrorefiner 
19. Consolidated lanthanide elements waste form 
20. Salt sent through an ion exchange to remove the Cs and Sr 
21. Salt returned to the electrolytic reduction vessel after removal of Cs and Sr 
22. Consolidated Cs/Sr waste form. 
The first step of the process is to mechanically chop the spent LWR fuel pins and collect the segments 
in baskets, which are then physically transferred (path 1) to a furnace where they can be heated to about 
480°C in air. This is done to drive off the tritium (path 3), which should be collected in an offgas system 
similar to that used for aqueous processing. The spent fuel segments are then transferred (path 2) to the 
next vessel for electrolytic reduction of the oxide fuel to metal. This is accomplished using an 
electrochemical process conducted in a LiCl salt at a temperature of about 650°C. Additional fission 
product gases such as xenon and krypton are released during this step and are collected. During this step, 
the Cs and Sr partition to the salt phase and are recovered in a separate operation when the LiCl salt is 
cleaned, possibly through the use of ion exchange (least mature of all of the pyroprocessing steps), (path 
20) for consolidation into a separate waste form (path 22). After cleaning, the salt with Cs and Sr removed 
is then returned to the electrolytic reduction vessel (path 21). 
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Once the elements in the chopped fuel pin segments have been reduced from oxide to metal, the spent 
fuel segments, with some adhering LiCl salt, are then removed from the oxide reduction vessel and 
transferred to the electrorefiner vessel (path 4) using the same baskets so that there is no transfer of spent 
fuel segments from one basket to another. The baskets containing the segments are used as the anode in 
the electrorefining process. The electrorefining process uses a LiCl/KCl salt mixture, which during 
operation also contains chloride compounds of all of the actinide elements and some of the fission 
products. Once loaded into the electrorefiner vessel, the anode basket contents can be ionized into the salt 
using an electric current, effectively forming chloride compounds of the U/TRU elements and some of the 
fission products. Some of the elements can also react spontaneously with the compounds in the 
electrorefiner salt, forming chloride compounds. 
The electrorefining process operates at 500°C and will separate and recover the uranium from the 
spent fuel as a solid uranium product at the cathode, typically as a finely divided uranium solid in a 
basket, with some electrorefiner salt adhering to the product (path 6). Since the electrorefiner salt contains 
the transuranic elements as chlorides, along with other elements such as lanthanide fission products, the 
salt adhering to the uranium product will also have these elements. The uranium processing step (cathode 
processor) melts the uranium product and salt collected at the cathode and distills the salt under vacuum 
(up to 1200°C) to separate it from the uranium metal, which is consolidated into a uranium metal ingot 
(with about 0.02–0.025% TRU contamination at most) in the cathode processor at the same time as the 
distillation is occurring. The cathode processor contains a reusable coated metallic crucible to avoid 
chemical interaction with the salt and liquid uranium and prevent losses during this operation, ensuring 
complete recovery of the salt. The uranium metal ingot is sent to storage (path 8) and is one of the 
products of the pyroprocessing operation (although it is also possible to send some of the uranium product 
to an oxidant production step to supply new process chemicals for the electrorefiner; that variation is not 
shown here as it would not alter the basic safeguards approach). The distilled salt is condensed in a 
separate container. The recovered salt is transferred to the U/TRU recovery vessel for processing to 
recover the U/TRU (path 9). 
The materials remaining in the anode basket, after the electrotransport of uranium to the cathode and 
the electrodissolution of the other actinides and the more active fission products, are the cladding hulls 
and the less active fission products. The anode basket contents will also have electrorefiner salt adhering 
to them. The contents of the anode baskets are transferred (path 7) to the metal waste furnace, which is 
similar to the cathode processor in that the adhering salt is distilled under vacuum at high temperature (up 
to 1600°C), leaving the metals to be consolidated into an ingot. The ingot is transferred to storage 
(path 12). The distilled salt is condensed and the recovered salt is also transferred (path 11) to the U/TRU 
recovery vessel, where it is combined with the salt recovered from the cathode processor operations. 
The U/TRU recovery step can be one of several options. At this time, partial electrolysis of the salt is 
proposed in the first step to recover the majority of the uranium and transuranic materials as metals, as 
this has proven to be a viable approach. This process will probably operate at 500°C and will produce 
chlorine gas as the U/TRU chloride compounds are reduced to metals. As it is removed from the U/TRU 
recovery vessel, the resulting metallic U/TRU product will have adhering salt, and the product needs to be 
processed to distill the salt from the metal product in the U/TRU processing step. The resulting metal 
U/TRU ingot (path 14) is another major product of the pyroprocessing operation. The U/TRU 
composition in the metallic ingot is typically about 50% U/50% TRU, but the process can be adjusted if 
desired to achieve as high as 75–85% TRU. The recovered salt is combined with the salt remaining in the 
U/TRU recovery vessel for the drawdown operation (paths 13 and 15), potentially using the same vessel. 
The U/TRU drawdown step is a further electrolysis of the salt to complete the electrolysis of the 
U/TRU for recovery of the remaining U/TRU in the salt. The metallic U/TRU product recovered in this 
step is contaminated with lanthanide metals. The metallic product mixture of U/TRU and lanthanide 
metal is recycled back to the electrorefiner for further processing with additional chopped fuel pin 
segments (path 17). Additional chlorine gas is produced during this process. After the drawdown step to 
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recover the remaining U/TRU, most of the remaining lanthanide fission products are recovered with 
additional electrolysis, with some salt still remaining in the U/TRU drawdown vessel. The lanthanide 
metal product is removed and sent for processing into a waste form, another major product of the process 
(path 16). The waste processing recovers any salt adhering to the lanthanide metal product, which is 
combined with the rest of the salt from the lanthanide recovery step and returned to the electrorefiner 
(path 18), while the lanthanide ingot is transferred to storage (path 19). 
As this brief discussion of pyroprocessing operations illustrates, pyroprocessing operates with a small 
number of independent and discrete vessels, with a limited number of material transfers between vessels. 
In addition, during normal operations, the material transfers are unique, in that material originating in one 
vessel only has one destination, either another vessel or product storage. It is this discrete handling and 
the uniqueness of the material motions that make an alternative safeguards strategy possible with 
pyroprocessing. Depending on the inherent characteristics of other advanced processing options, it is 
possible that similar features can be exploited in developing the appropriate safeguards approach for that 
technology. 
2.2 Pyroprocessing Equipment and Potential Facility Description 
Based on the discussion of processing spent LWR fuel with pyroprocessing, the following is a list of 
the equipment that can contain the actinide elements during the process: 
• Chopper for spent LWR fuel 
• Low temperature voloxidation furnace 
• Electrolytic reduction vessel 
• Electrorefiner vessel 
• Uranium cathode processor 
• Metal waste furnace 
• U/TRU recovery vessel (salt processing) 
• U/TRU cathode processor (may be the same as the uranium cathode processor) 
• U/TRU salt drawdown vessel (may be the same as the U/TRU recovery vessel) 
• Lanthanide waste processor 
• Ceramic waste furnace 
It is important to recognize that each of these pieces of equipment is of relatively small size due to 
criticality constraints. Typical volumes are on the order of several cubic meters or less, depending on the 
limits needed to prevent criticality by using criticality-safe geometry, especially for the U/TRU products. 
These product ingots are expected to be typically on the order of 5–10 kg, with the equipment sized 
appropriately. It is also important to note that all materials, although not items in the traditional sense, are 
moved and can be tracked as items between each piece of equipment, as will be discussed below. 
There are several advantages to small size for processing equipment: 
• All of the processing equipment can be placed in one compact, inerted (i.e., argon atmosphere), 
hot-cell environment with a substantial background radiation field 
• Each piece of equipment is small, facilitating maintenance and repair 
• Processing monitoring functions only need to be focused on one compact area 
• A very limited number of penetrations for material movement, typically on the order of 4–5 
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• Introducing spent fuel assemblies 
• Introducing product chemicals (as needed, such as chlorine and LiCl/KCl salt, with the option of 
adding zeolite and glass frit if waste processing occurs in this hot cell) or new small equipment 
(could be the same portal used for the spent fuel assemblies) 
• Product shipment 
• Waste shipment 
• Samples to the analytical laboratory 
The limited number of penetrations facilitates monitoring of the hot-cell portals and is another 
inherent characteristic of a pyroprocessing facility that can be advantageous in designing the safeguards 
system. 
2.3 An Example of Traditional Safeguards Approach 
for Pyroprocessing 
Pyroprocessing has typically been considered for the processing of spent fast reactor fuel and has 
been applied in experimental testing at the Fuel Conditioning Facility (FCF) at Idaho National Laboratory 
(INL) for the treatment of spent Experimental Breeder Reactor-II (EBR-II) fuel. Based on this experience, 
conceptual designs for larger facilities have been developed and have been the subject of an initial 
safeguards study for application to processing fast reactor fuel.5 There are features in these analyses that 
are not being considered in this example, such as the fabrication of fast reactor fuel from the recovered 
materials, and there are processing steps and pathways that are not applicable to the processing of spent 
LWR fuel being discussed here. Nevertheless, this initial study can provide useful examples for the 
application of traditional safeguards approaches to such a facility. 
Of interest in this report are the details of the approach and the conclusions on limitations pertaining 
to such a facility that were described in the progress report for the study. The goals and proposed 
approach can be summarized as follows, both for the processing itself and the safeguards measures that 
would be used:5 
Equipment and Material Transfer Batch Sizes 
Given the required daily material flows, both equipment and material transfer 
batch sizes are estimated. The design criteria for these batch sizes aim to balance 
multiple operations and safeguards-related objectives, including, most 
importantly, the following: 
i) Minimize material transfers 
ii) Optimize interfaces between consecutive process steps 
iii) Minimize in-transit material inventory (especially to facilitate safeguards 
 inspection efforts) 
iv) Facilitate the implementation of safeguards monitoring techniques by  
 suggesting material transfer batch sizes that can be assayed, for example, 
 using feasible NDA instrumentation 
v) Minimize number of multiple process lines 
vi) Satisfy criticality constraints 
vii) Select equipment cycle times that would not demand significant R&D 
 development but are based on currently achievable operational values. 
With respect to safeguards requirements, all items entering or exiting the process 
cell should be monitored using a combination of containment and surveillance 
(C/S), destructive assay (DA), and non-destructive assay (NDA) methods. 
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Material Balance Areas 
One MBA is proposed for the pyroprocessing operations that occur in the 
process cell, including chopping the fuel pins, uranium electrorefining, uranium 
product processing, TRU recovery, and TRU product processing. 
Safeguards Approach Overview 
The proposed safeguards approach for the spent fast reactor fuel pyroprocessing 
that occurs in the process cell consists of the following main features: 
• Mass tracking, particularly of the inputs to and outputs from the 
shipping/receiving and process cells. Specifically, the mass of the spent 
fuel is balanced against the mass of the assembly hardware waste and 
the fuel pins from the receiving portion of the shipping/receiving cell. 
The mass of the pins, pin hardware, and assembly hardware is balanced 
against the mass of the fresh fuel pins in the assembly portion of the 
shipping/receiving cell. The mass of the fuel pins, external TRU, and 
external U input to the process cell is balanced against the salt and clad 
sent to metal waste, the salt sent to ceramic waste, and the products sent 
to storage. 
• Total neutron measurement on each element as it transfers from the 
shipping/receiving cell to the PC for chopping. 
• Total neutron measurement on the chopped pin segments as they transfer 
to the electro-refiner. 
• Total neutron measurement of the waste streams (salt and metal) leaving 
the process cell. 
• Validation of the modeled (burnup calculation) Cm/Pu ratio in the 
chopped pins via DA (Sample A). 
• Destructive analyses (DA) of the electrorefiner contents (sample) to 
validate burnup calculations, the Pu content of the salt/clad sent to 
waste, and the homogeneity of the salt. 
• Destructive analyses (DA) of the spent salt from TRU recovery (sample) 
to validate the Pu content of the salt sent to ceramic waste processing, 
and the homogeneity of the salt. 
• Process monitoring on the electro-refiner and TRU recovery. 
• Integrated optical surveillance and neutron monitoring of all MBA 
transfer paths and the transfer of chopped pins from the chopper to the 
ER within MBA-2. 
The inspection regime will be complemented by optical surveillance and neutron 
monitoring (total neutrons) applied to all ports that provide access to the 
shipping/receiving cell. This includes the loading port(s), the transfer port(s) to 
the process cell, and the equipment hatch to the shielded repair area. The 
neutron monitor on the transfer port to the process cell may be the same 
instrument used to measure the total neutron rate from each element. The 
neutron monitor on the shipping/receiving loading port is qualitative, being used 
to detect the transfer of nuclear material but not provide a non-destructive assay. 
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The safeguards approach for the process cell is based on extensive process 
monitoring and C/S measures to complement the accounting verification. The 
uncertainty in measurement of the Pu in the process is expected to be high from a 
safeguards perspective for several reasons. First, the bulk material is not 
expected to be verifiably homogeneous. Second, NDA methods (e.g. neutron 
counting) have an uncertainty of several percent, which would result in a large 
uncertainty in terms of kg of Pu. That would be compounded because existing 
methods based on curium counting require determining the ratio of Cm to Pu 
from a DA (which is complicated because the materials are not assured of being 
homogeneous). Other forms of NDA (e.g. gamma spec) would not have 
significantly better uncertainty, and there do not appear to be any new methods 
or technologies on the foreseeable horizon that would facilitate sufficient 
accuracy to meet IAEA needs without C/S and process monitoring. Finally, the 
holdup within the equipment in this MBA is expected to be large, and means to 
verify holdup are expected to be limited. Hence, while the safeguards approach 
would undoubtedly include review/audit of the accounting records and some 
degree of verification of the quantities reported in the accounting records, the 
main focus would be on ensuring that the process is operating as declared and 
using C/S to provide confidence that no material is diverted from the process. 
The safeguards approach consists of: 
1. Audit of the accounting records for self-consistency and consistency with 
accounting records from external sources that involve inputs/outputs to the 
system. 
2. Surveillance cameras integrated with monitoring of neutron signals at all 
inputs to and outputs from the process cell (PC). These would be used, in 
part, to detect undeclared process modifications and to ensure that material 
movements are along declared paths, etc. Surveillance cameras monitor 
transfers within the process cell. 
3. Measurement of total neutrons from each fuel pin as it transfers into the 
process cell. 
4. A DA sample of the chopped pins to validate the burnup calculations, which 
provide the Cm/Pu ratio and absolute Pu content. Initially, several samples 
per assembly at various pin and axial positions will be taken to confirm the 
validity of the burnup calculation method for the axial and radial isotopic 
variation in that reactor. Once the burnup calculations have been validated, 
it should be possible to reduce sampling to one sample per assembly. 
5. Measurement of total neutrons from the chopped fuel pins as they are 
transferred into the electrorefiner (ER) in the anode basket. 
6. The metal waste (cladding) stream from the electrorefiner will be monitored 
with a neutron counter supported by DA sample to measure the TRU content. 
Optical surveillance will support continuity of knowledge (COK) for the 
stream, verifying that the metal moves from the ER through the detector and 
on to the next stage of waste processing outside of the PC. 
7. Uranium metal removed from the ER is transferred to U Product Processing. 
As with the metal waste stream, this stream is expected to contain little TRU, 
although the electrodes will be coated in salt from the ER. Optical 
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surveillance will provide COK for the stream, verifying that the electrodes 
move from the ER to the UP. 
8. The salt transferred to ceramic waste is expected to contain very small (loss) 
amounts of TRU. Neutron counting in combination with the Cm/Pu ratio 
measured in a sample is used to verify the TRU content of the salt transferred 
to ceramic waste. 
9. Neutron measurement and optical surveillance are used to verify that TRU is 
not transferred out of the process cell through a non-standard route. 
10. The ingots produced by the TRU Product Processing process and the U 
Product Processing process are transferred to the Product Prep stage. For 
both of these in-cell transfers, surveillance cameras are used to verify that 
ingots are not diverted during the short transfer. It is assumed that a 1-month 
processing inventory can be contained in the Product Prep stage area. 
(Product Prep was needed in the study to prepare materials for fuel 
fabrication, a part of the process not considered in the example in this 
report). 
11. Additional radiation monitors, surveillance cameras, and seals will be 
applied to other cell penetrations that provide potential diversion paths. At 
this stage, it is assumed that infrequently used hatches will be sealed, but that 
in addition neutron monitors and cameras will be installed to monitor 
activity when the hatches are unsealed. Penetrations that are never intended 
to see the transfer of radioactive material may be monitored with radiation 
detectors configured to prevent shielding. Penetrations intended for only 1-
way flow have pairs of radiation detectors to verify reverse flow including 
insertion of neutron emitters that could be used to provide false signals to 
neutron detectors. All of these monitors tie into a central data collection 
point for remote monitoring by the IAEA. 
12. In addition, extensive process monitoring is used to verify that the facility is 
operated as declared. Where possible, authenticated signals from the 
operator’s process monitoring equipment are used, but where required, 
independent IAEA monitoring equipment may be installed. The process 
monitoring in the electrorefiner is outlined as follows: 
a. Cell voltage 
The cell voltage in the electrorefiner provides an indication of the 
quality of the product being collected at the cathode. Under normal 
operation, the cell voltage should remain within a specified range, 
below an upper limit. Exceeding this limit can signal the production 
of a cathode deposit with a TRU/U ratio higher than design 
specifications. 
b. Cell current 
The cell current in the electrorefiner provides an indication of the 
rate that material is being electrotransported to the cathode. Cell 
current is controlled as part of the electrorefining process, provided 
cell voltage does not exceed the limit as described in the previous 
paragraph. Observing a nonzero value for the current between the 
anode and the cathode, along with an adequate value for cell voltage, 
will signal that the electrorefiner is being operated and that a cathode 
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deposit is being produced. Cell current is integrated with respect to 
time to compute the ampere hours passed during each electrorefiner 
run. This ampere-hours value is related to the amount of material 
(primarily uranium) electrotransported and deposited at the 
respective cathode during the given electrorefiner run. In steady state 
operation, the ampere-hours value of any electrorefiner run should be 
within an expected range, depending on the mass in the anode basket. 
The case of a low ampere-hour value associated with an 
electrorefiner run may signal incomplete processing of a given spent 
fuel batch, which could imply subsequent unauthorized material 
diversion or processing scenarios. These integrated cell currents can 
also be used as a consistency check against material inventories that 
may be computed from measurements taken at subsequent process 
steps. 
c. Species concentration 
The concentrations of important species (particularly U and Pu) in 
the electrolytic salt are monitored for process control and also 
provide an indication on the quality of the cathode material that may 
be produced not only by electrorefining but also by electrolysis (when 
the salt is transferred out for further processing). The concentrations 
are periodically measured by sampling the electrorefiner salt. In 
general, these concentration measurements provide salt chemistry 
information of potential utility for safeguards. Under normal 
operation, the Pu/U ratio should remain within a specified range, 
below an upper limit. Production of unauthorized material with a 
high TRU/U ratio can be facilitated if a salt material with high 
TRU/U ratio is used, although criticality may limit the extent to which 
this can be done. It may also be possible to monitor concentrations of 
these ionic species online (i.e., U and Pu) in the eutectic salt using a 
technique based on voltammetry. 
d. Salt level and density 
Two additional process variables in the electrorefiner are 
periodically monitored for safeguards purposes, i.e., salt level and 
density. Given these two measurements and information on salt 
chemistry (from DA analysis or using the above online method for 
detecting and quantifying U and Pu concentrations), a total inventory 
of these species can be estimated for the electrorefiner. These values 
can then be used to compute, confirm, or calibrate U and Pu 
inventories derived from other methods.  
In addition to the measures described above, the facility will provide the IAEA 
with remote access to near real-time accounting information, allowing the IAEA 
to monitor for declared deviations from routine process flow patterns and 
consistency with monitoring and surveillance data. It is likely that the IAEA will 
maintain a resident inspector at or near the site or facility. Because of the 
relatively clean TRU emerging from the TRU extraction, this facility will require 
monthly interim inspection in addition to an annual Physical Inventory 
Verification. 
The IAEA would be expected to perform Design Information Verification (DIV) 
regularly on the process to monitor for process changes. In addition to process 
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monitoring, this would include visual inspection (to the extent possible) to look 
for modifications to the facility. 
Assumptions  
1. Process and support equipment modules will be computer controlled for 
automated operation and production with very limited operator involvement. 
Actuators, motors, cranes, and electromechanical manipulators will be used 
to perform the necessary operations. Small parts of the process may require 
the use of operators using master-slave manipulators to perform delicate 
tasks or tasks that cannot be easily automated. Cameras will be used to 
observe and operate equipment in the cell wherever possible. These cameras 
also can be part of a safeguards containment and surveillance (C/S) system 
to monitor material and equipment movements and to analyze operational 
events in near real-time viewing for safeguards purposes. 
2. The facility is designed to minimize, locate, and monitor penetrations in an 
optimal manner consistent with safeguards and inspection requirements. 
These penetrations can be classified according to their functions. For 
example, in-cell equipment requires feed-throughs with electrical power, 
video, instrumentation and control wiring, and gas supplies. There are also 
penetrations, such as hatches (e.g., the fuel assembly transfer hatch) and 
locks (e.g., the waste transfer lock), used to move material and equipment 
between cells. Pneumatic transfer systems are also present for transporting 
small amounts of material out-of-cell for testing and evaluation. There are 
also penetrations to accommodate thru-wall and thru-roof endoscope 
cameras, for example. 
3. Samples will leave the process cell in uniquely numbered tamper-resistant 
containers that are weighed and tracked. Assume a 1-week turnaround for 
sample results from the analytical laboratory. (No sample material is 
returned from the analytical laboratory. Assume all samples are consumed 
and destroyed.) Assume that samples are ~1 gram. 
As can be seen from the list of planned activities and assumptions, there is a significant emphasis on 
NDA and sampling, although some of the proposed NDA would likely be difficult in the high radiation 
environment expected in the process cell. Portal monitoring is also used, consisting of optical surveillance 
and neutron monitoring. It is clear that the underlying basis of the approach is mass balances, while 
recognizing that equipment holdup is expected to be large with limited means of verification. While no 
evaluation of the effectiveness of this safeguards approach was made in the study, it is noted that “the 
safeguards approach for the process cell is based on extensive process monitoring and C/S measures to 
complement the accounting verification. The uncertainty in measurement of the Pu in the process is 
expected to be high from a safeguards perspective. It is not clear that this safeguards approach would be 
judged as adequate to meet safeguards goals or not, but there is significant room for improvement by 
considering the characteristics of the process and the processing operations. 
2.4 An Alternative Approach to Meeting Safeguards Goals 
The previous section has described an approach to safeguards that essentially follows current practice 
for processing plants using PUREX, with emphasis on material accounting and NDA. It is likely that this 
approach would face the same limitations that occur with a large PUREX processing plant in that the 
throughput is so large that detecting the quantity of interest, 1 SQ, within technically achievable 
measurement error limits is extremely difficult. However, with this pyroprocessing example, it is possible 
to take advantage of the nature of the pyroprocess, and the discrete batch nature of the process operations 
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to provide a different path towards verifying that there has not been any production or diversion of 
material. 
2.4.1 The Process Cell 
In developing an alternate safeguards approach, the first area to consider is the process cell itself, 
which is a heavily shielded hot cell that contains all of the equipment used for the pyroprocessing 
operations in an inert gas atmosphere, starting with chopping of the fuel. The process cell has a limited 
number of penetrations, designed for the following: 
1. Insertion of the spent-fuel assemblies, occurring at a rate consistent with processing needs 
2. Insertion of process chemicals sufficient to support processing needs (although this can be very 
limited depending on the amount of process chemical regeneration that is planned within the process 
cell) 
3. Replacement equipment as needed 
4. Withdrawal of products, including uranium and U/TRU 
5. Withdrawal of waste materials for both the ceramic and metallic waste forms. 
To verify that these are the only materials that enter the process cell, monitoring the process cell 
portals would be sufficient. It is not unreasonable to expect that this could be achieved with 100% 
certainty (i.e., there should be no reason that materials and equipment not needed for normal operation 
would not be detected) given the limited types of materials that enter and their characteristics, and that the 
monitoring could also be verified remotely if desired. Both visual observation and NDA are sufficient to 
verify that either spent fuel or the appropriate process chemicals are being introduced to the cell. 
Replacement equipment would also be readily verified, as would the removal of equipment for repair or 
replacement. 
For materials leaving the cell, the uranium and U/TRU product ingots would be verifiable by NDA, 
and samples taken within the process cell and analyzed in the analytical laboratory would verify the 
composition. Waste stream materials can also be verified for the lack of TRU by NDA, given the 
relatively small masses that would exit at each time. However, the ability to make fine distinctions in the 
amount of TRU on the U/TRU ingots and in the waste streams to the desired accuracy is probably not 
achievable with NDA. This difficulty can be addressed with the conduct of operations within the process 
cell and additional instrumentation. Note that development of new NDA or other technologies for portal 
monitoring would likely not be required with this approach in order to meet safeguards goals. 
2.4.2 Item, Motion, and Position Accounting in the Process Cell 
Following the example used in the FCF for processing EBR-II spent fuel, all movements of materials 
within the process cell would be monitored. The discrete nature of the pyroprocessing operations allows 
creation of “items,” even though the materials are being handled are “bulk” in nature. Starting with the 
incoming fuel assembly, the first operation is to chop the assembly. Note that the spent fuel assembly 
would only have one introduction point through the appropriate portal, and it would have only one 
destination, the fuel assembly chopping machine, although it is likely that the first operation performed in 
the cell would be to weigh the assembly. In this proposal, the equipment that moves the spent fuel 
assembly from the portal to the weighing station and then to the chopping machine would be 
instrumented for location within the cell so that the data coming from the equipment would allow one to 
verify that the fuel assembly had moved from the portal to the weighing station and then to the fuel 
assembly chopping machine, and nowhere else. If desired, one could also attach a time “stamp” to the 
movements, similar to that used in FCF. Any movement of the fuel assembly outside of the normal path 
would be detected as an anomaly and could be used to send an alarm. 
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At the chopping machine, the spent fuel assembly would be chopped into pieces suitable for the next 
stage of the process. All of the pieces would be directed into containers, each of which is numbered and 
tracked within the process cell as an item. The procedure would be to chop the assembly (the chopping 
action is also monitored by assembly position, and is needed for assuring that the chopped pin pieces are 
of the appropriate size), collect the pieces in a number of containers, and move the containers to a 
weighing station where the mass in each container would be measured. The container number, its weight, 
and the time when the container was weighed define the creation of an “item” for tracking purposes. 
Again, there is only one path from the chopper to the weighing station. Once weighed, it is likely that the 
containers would be temporarily stored prior to the next step of the process and that this storage location 
would be between the fuel assembly chopping machine and the low-temperature voloxidizer in this case, 
referring to Figure 1. The specific storage location would also correspond to specific movements by the 
equipment moving the containers, and the movements would be recorded to verify that a given container 
has gone to a specific storage location at a specific time. In this manner, it is possible to accurately and 
positively track the motion and location of all materials within the process cell even if there is uncertainty 
about the composition of the materials in the container. It is also possible to positively detect any non-
standard movement of material within the process cell, greatly limiting the ability of the operator to 
perform non-standard operation. (The method of tracking the creation of items and the time stamp for 
weighing has already been demonstrated in FCF, and has been successful in detecting improper 
procedures from a remote location.) 
When the container is retrieved from storage at the time of processing in the voloxidizer, the desired 
container number is identified, as is its current location in the temporary storage area. Upon retrieval, the 
container number is verified, and the container is reweighed to check that there has been no change 
(within weighing error, typically on the order of grams) in the contents of the container. If the new 
measured weight does not agree with the weight when the “item” was created, within weighing error 
limit, an alarm is sent. Note that even if one had wanted to substitute material in the container, with all 
equipment in the process cell monitored for movement (as are uses of the scales for weighing), it would 
not be possible to substitute material without being detected, as such movements would also be non-
standard. There is also the question of what material would be used, since all materials entering and 
leaving the cell are verified, so that no non-standard material would be available for the substitution. 
If the same container is used in the next operation, as could occur with the voloxidizer (where volatile 
fission products are removed), electrolytic reduction (where the container could be used as the anode 
basket and the oxides are reduced to elements), and the electrorefiner (where the container could be used 
as the anode basket and the actinides and some fission products are electrotransported), the container 
would be weighed before and after each operation, and every movement of the container is monitored and 
recorded as well. Any non-standard movement would be detected. After the electrorefiner run was 
finished, the container would now only contain cladding hulls and fission products that are less reactive 
than uranium in the electrorefiner salt. After removal from the electrorefiner and weighing, the container 
would be emptied and the existence of the “item” would be terminated. Note that the “item”—the 
container and its contents—changes weight as a result of processing, and all weights and times of 
weighing are recorded. Once empty, the container is weighed to verify or adjust the tare weight for the 
container for its next use. 
The same approach is used throughout the process cell. In this manner, it is possible to detect any 
non-standard movement of material. With monitoring of the operating conditions on the processing 
equipment, it is also possible to detect non-standard equipment operation, making undetected misuse or 
production in the facility impossible. It is interesting to note that with this approach, it is possible for one 
to conclude with certainty that no diversion or misuse has occurred within the process cell even if one has 
no knowledge of the compositions of materials within the process cell, and the goal of safeguards can 
been achieved in a completely different manner than is done in a PUREX plant. 
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2.4.3 Material Compositions 
As a practical matter, it is important to have some knowledge of the compositions of materials within 
the cell for process control and criticality concerns. The approach discussed above has been used in FCF 
and would likely be continued in a future pyroprocessing facility. The compositions are based on 
calculations of the spent fuel contents that are verified by taking one or more samples when the spent fuel 
is chopped. Any axial distribution of fuel composition is adjusted so that the calculated composition 
matches the measured composition at the sample(s) location. As the fuel is chopped, the adjusted 
calculated compositions are used to specify the composition of the contents of the container, and become 
another part of the item description, and follow the item as it moves through the facility. When processing 
occurs on an item, as would happen in the electrorefiner for example, the composition of the container 
would be modified either based on samples taken, or on models of the process operation. In this manner, 
an estimate of composition is available for all locations in the process cell, even for those where sampling 
is not possible. 
In some cases, the generation of an estimated composition for an item at a given location requires 
data from both pre- and post-processing samples. For example, to fully provide all of the information 
required by the electrorefiner model in FCF, it was necessary to use the incoming spent fuel compositions 
and the product compositions at the end of processing. As part of the calculation process, it is also 
necessary to propagate the compositions through other equipment, such as the cathode processor, using 
additional models as needed. The end result is that the compositions can always be estimated, although 
for some items, the compositions are only known after processing has been completed and the item no 
longer exists. As has been mentioned, this information is only used for process control and is not part of 
the information needed for safeguards. 
2.4.4 Mass Tracking 
As part of process control, the sampled and calculated/propagated material compositions are used to 
perform mass balances on the process cell. This was done for the FCF EBR-II spent fuel processing and 
was successful in demonstrating that this approach could be used to verify the inventory and flow of 
uranium and plutonium in the facility. The same approach would be used in the large-scale 
pyroprocessing facility, but one would again have to address the issue of having 1 SQ of material being 
well within the ability to resolve, given the anticipated measurement accuracies. However, as described 
above, the ability to provide the mass balance to a certain degree of accuracy is not necessary for 
achieving safeguards goals in this facility. 
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3. SUMMARY 
As stated earlier in this report, the fundamental objective of safeguards is “the timely detection of 
diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture 
of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of 
such diversion by the risk of early detection.” This goal is achieved by the detection of the loss of 1 SQ, 
with timeliness determined by the type of material, either 1 month for unirradiated direct-use material or 3 
months for irradiated direct-use material, where direct-use material is defined as material which can be 
used without further enrichment or irradiation. The goal is to be able to conclude that no diversion has 
occurred. The example of a pyroprocessing facility has been used in this study to illustrate how one could 
meet the safeguards goals in a non-traditional manner, possibly achieving an even greater measure of 
assurance than is possible today with conventional spent fuel processing and the existing safeguards 
approaches, and removing the burden of developing and implementing new NDA and other technologies 
as they are not essential to achieving safeguards goals. 
An additional advantage of the type of monitoring described in this study is that the oversight 
required for safeguards can be performed remotely to a significant level of detail, even to the point of 
observing operations and all material movements in a virtual 3-D environment as they occur, if desired. A 
simplified version of this approach has already been demonstrated to be effective in this manner through 
the detection at a remote location of improper operations at FCF. All of the material movements 
associated with standard processing procedures will follow unique pathways through the facility; when 
used with item accounting as described in this study, this type of process monitoring will ensure that only 
standard processing is occurring, and that no non-standard processing is being done, reinforcing the 
conclusion that no diversion or misuse has occurred. 
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Appendix A 
 
IAEA, DOE, and NRC Approaches to Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Facilities 
The most relevant regulation and requirement documents used to safeguard and secure nuclear 
material and nuclear facilities, produced by the Department of Energy (DOE), International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), have been assembled into a user-
friendly targeted reference library called the Nuclear Security Reference Library. This quick-reference 
library provides easy access to the most pertinent regulatory documents related to safeguards and security 
used to determine the highest level goals, objectives, and strategies that each regulatory body uses to 
protect nuclear materials, equipment, and facilities. A high-level review of each organization’s physical 
protection regulations and requirements will be given, followed by a comparison of the common goals, 
objectives, and strategies of each organization. 
Department of Energy 
The DOE is principally a national security agency that supports national security interest through 
ensuring the United States’ energy security, nuclear security, advancements in technology, and providing 
a responsible resolution to the nuclear weapons legacy. Focusing on DOE’s nuclear security 
responsibilities, their goal is to prevent security events that could potentially lead to interruption, 
disruption, or compromise of DOE operations or facilities. The DOE has identified unauthorized access, 
theft, and sabotage involving nuclear material as unacceptable security events, stated in the Objectives 
section of DOE M 470.4-2 Chg 1. The DOE has determined that risks associated with security events can 
be greatly mitigated by implementing a physical protection system whose objectives are to prevent, 
detect, assess, delay, and deter unauthorized individuals and materials from passing through controlled 
boundaries. Section A of Part 1 of DOE M 470.4-1 states this as follows: “to prevent, detect, or deter 
unauthorized access to or loss of controlled matter.” These system requirements are mandated in Chapter 
4 of DOE M 470.4-2 Chg 1. The overarching goal and high-level objectives are the products of four 
governing principle strategies that embody the DOE’s physical protection philosophy. 
The governing principle strategies that guide the DOE’s physical protection system are: incorporation 
of the design basis threat (DBT), graded protection of nuclear material, defense-in-depth strategy, and the 
Integrated Safeguards and Security Management program. In August 2008, the DBT was replaced by a 
new strategy called the Graded Security Protection (GSP) Policy, instituted by DOE O 470.3B, which 
replaced DOE O 470.3A. The GSP is steadily being worked into the current physical protection system. 
Due to the newness of the GSP and the long-standing history of applying the DBT, the DBT will be used 
here to establish the principle rationale that the DOE has used to successfully implement their physical 
protection system. The aforementioned four principle strategies are established and discussed in detail in 
the following documents: DOE O 470.3B, DOE M 470.4-3 Chg 1, DOE M 470.4-1 Chg 1, DOE M 
470.4-2 Chg 1, and DOE P 470.1. The DBT identifies potential adversaries and assesses their capabilities 
and tactics. The DBT is changed when perceived threats change. The DBT is used in the design of DOE 
physical protection systems and is used to protect nuclear material and nuclear facilities. Nuclear facilities 
are protected by tailoring physical protection systems to be able to counter all perceived threats from all 
potential adversaries. It is stated in the Requirements section of Section A of DOE M 470.4-1 Chg 1 that 
the “DBT policy must be used with local threat guidance during the conduct of the vulnerability 
assessments” of nuclear facilities. The physical protection system is designed to address sub-national 
threats, which consider two possible scenarios: theft of controlled material by an invading force, with or 
without insider assistance, and sabotage by an invading force, with or without insider assistance. 
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Procedures and requirements are in place to ensure that planning is continually occurring to counter 
current and developing threats, which is mandated in DOE O 470.4A and DOE P 470.1. 
The second principle strategy is the mandatory implementation of the graded approach to physical 
protection, which is established in Chapter 1 of DOE M 470.4-2 Chg 1 and DOE M 470.4-1 Chg 1. This 
principle requires that material categorization is a key consideration in the establishment of physical 
protection requirements. The DOE classifies nuclear material by considering material quantity, chemical 
forms, isotopic composition purities, ease of separation, accessibility, concealment, portability, 
radioactivity, and self-protecting features. Nuclear material categorization requirements are provided in 
Chapter 1 of DOE M 470.4-6 Chg 1. Nuclear material that is categorized as having a greater potential for 
adverse consequences associated with material is more stringently protected. Similarly, nuclear material 
classified as having less pejorative consequences would be less stringently protected. The requirements 
associated with the establishment of security areas based on material categorization is discussed in 
Chapter 4 of DOE M 470.4-2c1. 
The third principle strategy of the DOE’s physical protection system is the implementation of the 
defense-in-depth strategy. The requirements for this strategy are discussed in DOE P 454.1 and Chapter 2 
of DOE G 454.1-1. The defense-in-depth strategy requires the use of multiple layers of active and passive 
obstacles to force an adversary to defeat or circumvent obstacles. The layered protection strategy reduces 
the importance of a single obstacle and allows for the implementation of different types of defenses, 
which increases the complexity of an intruder’s task. This strategy makes use of physical barriers, 
intrusion detection and assessment systems, contraband detection systems, and protective force. 
The three previously discussed principle strategies form a strongly coupled system that is specifically 
designed to counter sub-national threats. The fourth and final principle strategy further strengthens these 
tightly coupled systems by incorporating formal practices that establish requirements for physical 
protection planning, performance assessments, and process improvements. The fourth principle is the 
Integrated Safeguards and Security Management program and the established requirements are available 
in DOE P 470.1. The focus of this program is to integrate safeguards and security into management and 
work practices to incorporate risk management-based decision making into the physical protection 
system, further minimizing the possibilities of security events. This program is designed to increase the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the DOE physical protection system. 
The requirements and objectives mentioned above are applicable to the protection of nuclear 
materials at fixed facilities and in transit. The mechanisms used to prevent unauthorized access to nuclear 
material may be different for transporting nuclear material than that for fixed facilities, but the levels of 
protection should be comparable. Additionally, the same strategies that are used to protect nuclear 
material in fixed facilities are also used to protect nuclear material in transit. The physical protection 
requirements for transporting nuclear material are established in DOE M 470.4-2c1. 
In the event that the physical protection system is not sufficient to prevent unauthorized access and 
control of Category 1 and Category 2 nuclear material is lost, there is a backup plan in place to respond to 
the security events. In this situation, response operations are implemented, which consists of guards 
responding to an event that may involve recapture, recovery, and pursuit. These requirements are 
established in Chapter 1 of DOE M 470.4-3c1. Recapture refers to regaining control of nuclear material 
that is in unauthorized possession within the confines of a DOE site, whereas recovery refers to regaining 
control of the nuclear material that has been taken off-site, as defined by DOE M 470.4-7. Pursuit is 
formally called fresh pursuit, which refers to seeking out stolen nuclear material shortly after the control 
over the material has been lost and the material has been taken off-site. Response operations add yet 
another layer of protection, which is part of the defense-in-depth strategy. 
To fully realize their goal, the DOE cooperates with the IAEA to establish requirements that consider 
sub-national and national threats to the nuclear security of the United States. The DOE’s commitment to 
work with the IAEA is a substantial step in ensuring national, as well as global, nuclear security and is 
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established in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), INFCIRC/140. The structure and content of the NPT is 
provided in INFCIRC/153. 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
The goal of the IAEA is to assist in the spread of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes while ensuring 
that nuclear material, equipment, facilities, and information provided by the IAEA to developing nations 
will not be used to further any military objectives. This goal is stated in INFCIRC/274 and Chapter 1A of 
INFCIRC/66. To accomplish this goal the IAEA makes recommendations about international 
requirements for safeguards and security systems to prevent the diversion of controlled nuclear power 
related resources by national or sub-national threats. The documents that address the IAEA’s physical 
protection recommendations are in INFCIRC/225 and TECDOC-967. The recommendations and 
requirements that are used to counter sub-national threats will be discussed and used to ascertain the 
IAEA’s high-level physical protection objectives. 
The primary objectives of the IAEA’s physical protection system are to provide recommendations to 
member states to mitigate the risk of unauthorized removal of nuclear material and sabotage, as well as to 
support the recovery of missing or diverted nuclear material. These objectives are stated in Chapter 3 of 
INFCIRC/225. The IAEA recommends, in Chapter 4 of INFCIRC/225, that member states use IAEA 
recommendations to influence their national law to establish physical protection regulations that are 
regularly evaluated by a national regulator. In Article 2 of INFCIRC/274, it is established that by joining 
the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), which results in the establishment 
of national laws to ensure, as far as practicable, that nuclear material is protected to an established 
standard, as set by the IAEA and agreed upon by member states, which is stated in Article 3 of 
INFCIRC/274. CPPNM membership is interpreted as “affecting the sovereign rights of a State regarding 
the domestic use, storage, and transportation of such nuclear material.” 
The IAEA recommends the inclusion of high-level principles to accomplish their physical protection 
goals, which are similar to that of the DOE. There appears to be four key principle strategies that the 
IAEA uses to make recommendations: utilizing the DBT, instituting graded protection requirements, 
implementing the defense-in-depth strategy, and readiness to implement recovery operations. The IAEA’s 
first principle strategy is the DBT, which uses characteristics and capabilities of potential adversaries to 
determine necessary requirements to prevent unauthorized access to nuclear materials and nuclear 
facilities to mitigate the risks associated with theft of nuclear material and/or radiological sabotage. The 
recommendation for implementing the DBT is specified in Chapter 4 of INFCIRC/225. When considering 
the DBT, the IAEA considers two types of scenarios: internally and/or externally initiated events, as 
described in Chapter 2 of STI/PUB/1271. An internally initiated event occurs when adversaries attempt to 
gain access to a facility, with or without the assistance of an insider at the site. An externally initiated 
event occurs when the threat occurs outside of a boundary and does not require the on-site presence of an 
adversary. Examples of externally initiated events are having an adversary crash a plane into a reactor or 
shooting a rocket into a nuclear reactor facility. Considering these types of threats, prudent planning 
involving facility design, security hardware, guards, and procedures should be used to contend with these 
specified threats. 
The second principle strategy used by the IAEA is the implementation of the graded approach to 
physical protection. This approach establishes physical protection requirements based on possible 
adversary targets and the potential consequences of losing control of those targets. The IAEA categorizes 
nuclear material by material type, quantity, physical and chemical form, degree of dilution, radiation 
level, and the material’s self-protecting nature. The categorization requirements for nuclear material are 
provided in Chapter 5 of INFCIRC/225 and in Annex 2 of INFCIRC/274. Nuclear material of significant 
strategic value is more stringently controlled. The requirements for graded protection of nuclear material 
are described in Chapter 4 of INFCIRC/225. The physical protection requirements for the various 
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categories of nuclear material are provided in Chapter 6 of INFCIRC/225, which considers physical 
protection requirements for transportation, as well as fixed facility requirements. 
The defense-in-depth strategy is the third principle strategy that the IAEA utilizes in establishing 
recommendations, which is established in Chapter 4 of INFCIRC/225. Recommendations for physical 
protection requirements, for fixed facilities and shipments of nuclear material, are specified in 
Chapters 6-8 of INFCIRC/225 and Chapters 6-8 of TECDOC-967. 
The final and heavily emphasized aspect of the IAEA’s physical protection system is recovery 
operations. Specific recommendations and requirements are established in Chapter 3 of INFCIRC/225 
and Article 5 of INFCIRC/274. When a member state joins the CPPNM, the member state has agreed to 
cooperate internationally to recover lost or diverted nuclear material, upon request. In Article 7 of 
INFCIRC/274, illegal acts are defined and in Article 11 of INFCIRC/274, foundations are laid to enable 
extradition of international criminals. Agreements between the IAEA and member states are used to 
influence national law within the agreement nation. An excellent example of this, in practice, is the 
relationship between the IAEA and the NRC. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
The NRC’s overarching goal is to license and regulate the United States’ civilian nuclear industry, 
while protecting public health and safety, promoting national security, and protecting the environment. 
Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (10CFR), is the guiding document for the NRC. In 10CFR73, the 
physical protection requirements are established to protect nuclear material and nuclear facilities. 
The high level objectives of the NRC, stated in Part 45 of 10CFR73, are to implement the DBT 
strategy, detect and assess the passage of unauthorized individuals and material across controlled areas, 
develop and implement a response plan to safeguards contingency events, maintain effective 
communication networks, and to ensure that a single event cannot destroy the capabilities of the security 
organization to request off-site assistance. In October 2008, the NRC formally stated, in 10CFR50, the 
policy that requires concurrent consideration of safety and security in the design of nuclear reactor 
facilities that result in a security system that requires fewer human actions. Front end loading of the 
design process, specifically focusing on safety and security, enables a more effective implementation of 
physical protection systems, as well as other systems. The high level physical protection objectives and 
lower level requirements are specified in 10CFR73. The NRC’s guiding physical protection principle 
strategies can be reduced to implementing the DBT, graded protection, and layered protection. 
The implementation of the DBT and its required use are established in Part 1 and Part 20 of 
10CFR73. The material categorization of nuclear material is defined in Part 2 of 10CFR73 and the 
physical protection requirements for transportation and storage of nuclear material of strategic 
significance are established in Parts 25, 26, 40, 46, 67 of 10CFR73. 
Results and Conclusions 
The overarching goals of the IAEA, DOE, and NRC’s physical protection systems are to prevent theft 
of nuclear material, nuclear sabotage, and mitigate consequences of compromised material. The 
successful achievement of these goals is strived for by reaching established physical protection objectives, 
which can be achieved by implementing physical protection strategies. 
It has been concluded that there are strong similarities in the goals, objectives, and strategies used by 
the IAEA, DOE, and NRC’s physical protection systems. The conclusions in this paper were ascertained 
by reviewing pertinent physical protection regulatory requirements from each regulatory body. The 
requirements from each governing body were grouped by the intended objectives of each requirement. 
After reviewing the IAEA, DOE, and NRC’s physical protection requirements and exploring their 
identified objectives, it was clear that there were three key objectives: detect and assess unauthorized 
personnel and material, delay and prevent unauthorized intrusion, and initiate response and recovery 
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operations when needed. To achieve these objectives, each regulatory body uses focused physical 
protection strategies. The IAEA, DOE, and NRC use slightly different strategies to achieve their 
objectives, but they all use three principle strategies: the DBT, graded protection, and the defense-in-
depth strategy. From this type of analysis the similarities between regulatory organizations become 
apparent, which helps facilitated cooperative efforts and furthers an understanding of requirements. 
The most relevant documents, related to safeguards and physical protection, were integrated into a 
targeted library called the Nuclear Security Reference Library. The documents that are included in the 
Nuclear Security Reference Library are available in Appendix B. Some of the regulatory documents used 
in this paper that directly pertain to physical protection systems are briefly summarized in Appendix C. 
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Appendix B 
 
Nuclear Security Reference Library 
Table of Contents 
DOE 
PHYSICAL PROTECTION 
DOE M 470.4-1 Chg 1: Safeguards and Security Program Planning and Management 
DOE M 470.4-2 Chg 1: Physical Protection 
DOE M 470.4-3 Chg 1: Protective Force 
DOE P 470.1: Integrated Safeguards and Security Management (ISSM) Policy 
DOE M 470.4-7: Safeguards and Security Program References 
DOE P 454.1: Use of Institutional Controls 
DOE G 454.1-1: Institutional Controls Implementation Guide for Use with DOE P 454.1, Use of 
Institutional Controls 
DOE M 470.4-1 Chg 1: Safeguards and Security Program Planning and Management  
DOE O 470.3B : Graded Security Protection (GSP) Policy 
DOE O 420.1B: Facility Safety 
DOE G 473.2-1: Guide for Establishment of a Contingency Protective Force 
DOE 5480.30: Nuclear Reactor Safety Design Criteria 
DOE G 413.3-3: Safeguards and Security for Program and Project Management 
DOE O 413.3A Chg 1: Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets 
DOE M 470.4-5: Personnel Security 
PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE 
DOE O 142.2A: Voluntary offer Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency 
DOE 470.4-6 Chg 1: Nuclear Material Control and Accountability 
IAEA 
PHYSICAL PROTECTION 
IAEA INSAG-10: Defense in Depth in Nuclear Security 
IAEA TECDOC-967: Guidance and Considerations for the Implementation of INFCIRC/225, The 
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities 
IAEA STI/PUB/1133 Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency 
IAEA TECDOC-1357: Management of Disused Long Lived Sealed Radioactive Sources 
IAEA TECDOC-1355: Security of Radioactive Sources 
IAEA STI/PUB/1272: Nuclear Regulatory Systems 
IAEA INFCIRC/225: The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities 
IAEA INFCIRC/274: The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 
IAEA INFCIRC/66: The Agency’s Safeguards System 
IAEA STI/PUB/1271: Engineering Safety Aspect of the Protection of Nuclear Power Plants against 
Sabotage 
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PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE  
IAEA INFCIRC/153: The Structure and Contents of Agreements Between The Agency and States 
Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
IAEA INFCIRC/140: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
IAEA INFCIRC/26: The Agency’s Safeguards 
GC(49)/17: Nuclear Security – Measures to Protect Against Nuclear Terrorism  
IAEA INFCIRC/36: The Text of the Agreement for the Application of Agency Safeguards to Four United 
States Reactor Facilities 
IAEA INFCIRC/540: Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards 
IAEA INFCIRC/57: The Text of the Agreement for the Application of Agency Safeguards to the United 
States Reactor Facilities  
NRC 
PHYSICAL PROTECTION 
NRC NUREG 1614: Strategic Plan 
NRC 10 CFR 73: Physical Protection of Plants and Materials 
NRC 10 CFR 50: Policy Statement on the Regulation of Advanced Reactors 
PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE 
NRC 10CFR74: Material Control and Accounting of Special Nuclear Material 
NRC 10CFR75: Safeguards on Nuclear Material, Implementation of US/IAEA Agreement 
UN 
UN Resolution 255 (1968): Question relating to measures to safeguard non-nuclear-weapon States parties 
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 20% 
UN Resolution 1373 (2001): Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts 
UN Resolution 1540 (2004): Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
UN Resolution 1617 (2005): Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts 
UN Convention 2005: International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 
UN General Assembly A/62/156: Measure to Prevent Terrorist from Acquiring Weapons of Mass 
Destruction 
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Appendix C 
 
Summaries of DOE, IAEA, and NRC Documents 
DOE O 142.2A: Voluntary offer Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency 
The order defines the requirements for the Department of Energy (DOE) to be in compliance with the 
following agreements: Agreement between the United States and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency for the Application of Safeguards within the United States, Original Protocol of the Agreement, 
Additional Protocol, Subsidiary Arrangements, and Voluntary Offer Agreement. The requirements are 
primarily focused on IAEA access, information security, exceptions to access, and management 
responsibilities within the DOE. 
DOE M 470.4-2 Chg 1: Physical Protection 
The manual specifies DOE goals, objectives, requirements, and strategies for the protection of nuclear 
weapons, components, special nuclear materials and classified information. Physical protection 
subsystems, which are specifically addressed in the manual, can be grouped into three generic groups: 
denial, detection, and maintenance. The denial group refers to the requirements associated with 
preventing unauthorized access to secure areas by the implementation of the following subsystems: 
physical barriers, locks and keys, layered security areas, access controls, and protective forces. The 
detection group refers to requirements associated with detecting and assessing unauthorized penetrations 
into secure areas by using the following subsystems: intrusion detection and assessment systems, 
communication systems, and alarm management and controls systems. The maintenance aspect of the 
manual refers to general, corrective and preventive maintenance. 
DOE M 470.4-3 Chg 1: Protective Force 
The manual specifies management and operational requirements for DOE protective forces, which are 
based on risk-based management decisions to prevent security events that lead to interruption, disruption 
or compromise of DOE operations or facilities. Procedures and requirements are specified for protective 
forces management, as well as for equipment and facilities. The manual also establishes protective forces’ 
duties, operations, training and qualification, and testing. Additionally, requirements associated with 
special response teams and guidelines for fresh pursuit are specified. 
DOE O 452.4A: Security and Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons 
The objective of this order is to prevent the deliberate unauthorized use of U.S. owned nuclear 
explosives or nuclear weapons by specifying DOE and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) 
requirements and responsibilities. These responsibilities include development of security and methods to 
maintain and regain control of U.S. owned nuclear explosives and nuclear weapons. 
DOE O 452.3: Management of the Department of Energy Nuclear Weapons Complex 
The objectives of the order are to establish the authorities and responsibilities of the National Nuclear 
Security Administration to maintain and improve the safety, reliability, and performance of the nuclear 
weapons stockpile by continually improving the capabilities, technical expertise, and infrastructure of the 
Nuclear Weapons Complex. 
DOE P 470.1: Integrated Safeguards and Security Management (ISSM) Policy 
The objective of this policy is to provide an all encompassing system that uses risk-based strategies to 
provide a formal and organized process for planning, performing, assessing, and improving the quality of 
work, thereby making it more efficient and secure. The framework to accomplish these goals consists of 
  58
six components, which are: the objective, guiding principles, core functions, mechanisms, responsibilities, 
and implementation. 
DOE M 470.4-5: Personnel Security 
The objectives of the manual are to specify requirements for the Personnel Security Program are to 
grant access to DOE classified matter or special nuclear material, when the determination that access to 
this material will not endanger security or the common defense. The number of access authorizations will 
be kept to a minimum and the investigation process will be conducted in a way that ensures timely, 
efficient, consistent, objective, and fair interpretation of application information. Individuals will be 
periodically reevaluated to determine access eligibility and continued need for access. 
DOE M 470.4-7: Safeguards and Security Program References 
The manual provides the definitions for terms used in the Safeguards and Security Program within the 
DOE. 
DOE P 454.1: Use of Institutional Controls 
The goal of the policy is to protect human health and the environment by implementing institutional 
controls to ensure controls are effective, implemented as planned, maintained, reevaluated, and modified 
as required. The defense-in-depth strategy and property controls were focused on in the discussion of the 
implementation of institutional controls because of the vital role that they play in mitigating risks. 
DOE M 470.4-1 Chg 1: Safeguards and Security Program Planning and Management 
The objective of this manual is to specify program planning and management requirements that will 
be implemented into DOE operations, as determined by line management and sound risk management 
practices, with the ultimate goal of preventing security events from interrupting, disrupting, or 
compromising DOE services. The manual establishes the requirements and objectives regarding the 
DOE’s tactical doctrine, graded protection strategies, and management considerations. The requirements 
associated with the Site Safeguards and Security Plan, Site Security Plan, Self-Assessment Program, and 
vulnerability assessments are specified. Additionally, the requirements for the safeguards and security 
training and awareness programs are provided, as well as facility clearances and registration S&S 
activities. 
DOE O 470.3B: Graded Security Protection (GSP) Policy 
Classified 
DOE M 470.4-6: Nuclear Material Control and Accountability 
The manual establishes material controls and accountability for transfers and storage. This manual 
establishes requirements for equipment and procedures that must be in place to account for material. 
IAEA INFCIRC/140: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
This is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty between the IAEA and the United States. 
IAEA INFCIRC/153: The Structure and Contents of Agreements Between The Agency and States 
Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
This document contains additional information about the agreements established in the Non-
Proliferation Treaty that was signed by the United States. 
IAEA TECDOC-967: Guidance and Considerations for the Implementation of INFCIRC/225, The 
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities 
This document is a supplement to INFCIRC/225 and provides detail to established requirements. 
IAEA INFCIRC/225: The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities 
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The objectives of the INFCIRC/225 document are to establish physical protection recommendations 
on requirements for nuclear facilities, as well as for the use, storage, and transportation of nuclear 
material. Recommendations are made with respect to responsibility and authority associated with 
provided physical protection of nuclear materials at fixed sites or in-transit. Nuclear material types and 
quantities are categorized into groups based on the potential risks that are associated with the material if it 
were to be diverted from its intended use. 
IAEA INFCIRC/274: The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 
INFCIRC/274 specifies the requirements that member states need to adhere to in order to satisfy 
physical protection requirements for transport or storage of nuclear materials. The material types and 
quantities of nuclear materials that make up categories 1, 2, and 3 are defined. International collaborative 
efforts for the recovery and protection of nuclear material are clearly established, as is the international 
classification of extraditable offenses and related procedures. It is declared that by joining the convention 
that the sovereign rights of member states are affected, in regards to use, storage, and transport of nuclear 
material. Import and export requirements are place on member states. 
IAEA INFCIRC/66: The Agency’s Safeguards System 
The INFCIRC/66 document establishes controls to aid in the implementation of their obligations to 
spread nuclear energy while minimizing, where possible, the risks of nuclear weapons proliferation. The 
IAEA is looking to enlarge the contribution of atomic energy toward peace, health, and the prosperity 
throughout the world. Furthermore, their goal is to prevent the diversion of nuclear material, developed 
with their assistance, for any military purpose. Inspection and report guidelines are specified for the 
various nuclear facilities with the ultimate purpose of ascertaining if nuclear material has been diverted 
from its intended purpose. In addition, the provisions are specified for safeguarded nuclear materials in 
nuclear reactors, reprocessing plants, conversion plants, and fabrication plants. 
IAEA STI/PUB/1271: Engineering Safety Aspect of the Protection of Nuclear Power Plants against 
Sabotage 
The publication is specifically tailored to address the issues related to the prevention or mitigation of 
sabotage risks of nuclear facilities. A plant’s physical protection system is designed around the design 
basis threat and engineering safety aspects are designed to support the physical protection system, which 
constitutes an additional layer of defense that is part of the defense-in-depth strategy. 
Two threat scenarios are specified for the assessment of possible sabotage scenarios. The first is made 
up of either the insider threat or external adversaries who intend to invade the facility to accomplish their 
task. The second scenario refers to an external threat outside the plant boundary. This scenario considers 
adversaries using shoulder launched missiles, truck bombs, and the impact of a fully fueled Boeing 767. 
The targets that are considered are radioactive materials and nuclear reactors. 
The sabotage margin assessment procedure is used to evaluate the capacity of engineering safety 
provisions to resist the external standoff threat, which may or may not be included in the design basis 
threat for individual sites. The goal of the sabotage margin assessment is to define success paths that can 
demonstrate protection against the three scenarios. 
NRC 10 CFR 73: Physical Protection of Plants and Materials 
This part of the regulatory guide establishes physical protection requirements for in-transit and 
storage of nuclear material and protection requirements for nuclear facilities. 
